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THE UNIVERSITY'S LIABILITY FOR PROFESSOR-
STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER
TITLE IX
Henry Seiji Neivnwan
In May, 1994, Darleen E. Pallett, an undergraduate at Iona College,
received an "F" on a paper she had submitted in Professor Michael
Palma's British Poetry class.' Pallett agreed to meet Professor Palma
in his office on the Iona campus to discuss her grade.2 Upon her arri-
val, Palma closed the office door and sat in front of the door.3 Imme-
diately, Palma
embarked upon a sexually explicit discussion of his personal sexual
history, fantasies, and opinions. Palma closed his eyes, licked his
lips, and rubbed his hands together .... Palma told Pallett that he
envisioned her naked, stated that he was likely to have a sexual
dream about Pallett, and inquired into Pallett's personal sexual
activity.4
Only after stating that she had to go home did Palma address Pallett's
grade. Without looking at the paper, "Palma asked Pallett if she
would be happy with a final grade of 'C' for the course. Pallett said
that she would."6 Later, Pallett would learn that students and faculty
had filed at least five other harassment complaints against Professor
Palna.7
In January, 1995, Pallett filed suit under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX") 8 against Iona College. She
claimed that Iona should be liable for Palma's sexually discriminatory
acts.' 0 The district court, although acknowledging that Palma's behav-
ior was sexual harassment," granted Iona's motion for summary
judgement based on its finding that the college took appropriate re-
medial action upon learning of the harassment.1 2 On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit vacated the district court's decision.13 Relying on agency
1. Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1997).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 84.
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1687 (1994). Title IX provides, in part: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . I..." d. § 1681(a).
9. Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub nom.
Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
10. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 82.
11. Pallett, 914 F. Supp. at 1020.
12. Id. at 1025.
13. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 91.
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principles adopted from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 the
court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with the court's decision that Iona may be liable for the actions of
Professor Palma. 15
As the Iona case demonstrates, applying a proper standard of Title
IX institutional liability is an unsettled issue. 16 Recognizing the limits
of a university's moral incentives to end sexual harassment, 7 courts
and commentators view potential liability as an effective means of
preventing sexual harassment before it occurs18 and as an assurance
that institutions will respond quickly and determinedly to their legal
obligations. 9 Yet, there is considerable debate-among scholars as
well as within the courts-over the precise standard of liability to im-
pose upon universities."0 The significance of this unresolved issue is
14. Id. at 87-88. Title VII prohibits sexual discrimination in the workplace. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
15. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 91.
16. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1420-21, 1426 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (rejecting a Fifth Circuit standard of institutional liability, which requires
actual and affirmative intent to sexually harass, in favor of a "knows or should have
known" standard); Robert J. Shoop, The Legal Context of Sexual Harassment on
Campus, in Sexual Harassment on Campus: A Guide for Administrators, Faculty,
and Students 22, 23 (Bernice R. Sandler & Robert J. Shoop eds., 1997) [hereinafter
Sexual Harassment on Campus] ("[Elven when courts provide guidance, there is
often sharp disagreement [over] ... questions of truth, sanctions, and university liabil-
ity." (emphasis added)); see generally Dawn A. Ellison, Comment: Sexual Harass-
ment in Education: A Review of Standards for Institutional Liability Under Title IX,
75 N.C. L. Rev. 2049, 2146-47 (1997) (analyzing the relevant case law and noting that
there is confusion as to how a school can avoid liability).
17. Cf. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 658 (5th Cir. 1997)
(mentioning "morality" as an unspoken reason why the court's decision, which makes
it virtually impossible to hold a school liable for teacher-student sexual harassment,
does not encourage schools to adopt a "heads in the sand" approach to dealing with
sexual harassment).
18. See Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 Tex.
L. Rev. 525, 573-74 (1987) (arguing that litigation "may be the only effective way to
force the institution to comply with its statutory and regulatory obligations," and that
the "threat of institutional liability ... will make the institution more vigilant in deter-
ring conduct violative of Title IX"). An analysis of Title IX, the federal legislation
which protects students from sexual discrimination and harassment, demonstrates
that Congress did not phrase the statute as a prohibition but rather as "an affirmative
duty on the part of recipients of federal fimds to insure a school environment free of
discrimination." Brief for Petitioners, available in 1998 WL 19745, at *16, Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to 106
F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added).
19. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556. 572 (1982) (recognizing that by holding the company itself civilly liable, it is much
more likely that violations by the company's agents "will not occur in the future").
20. For a sampling of the approaches to the appropriate standard of liability in the
Title IX context, compare the following sources: Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 657 (requiring a
plaintiff to show "actual, intentional discrimination on the part of the school district");
Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring demonstration of a
supervisory relationship between professor and student of which the professor took
advantage); Carrie N. Baker, Comment, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based
Harassment of Students, 43 Emory L.J. 271, 290 (1994) (supporting strict liability of
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heightened by the recent increase in sexual harassment litigation
across the country.21 Thus, it is imperative to clarify the Title IX insti-
tutional liability standard in order to help rectify the problem of sex-
ual harassment on campus, and to promptly and equitably handle the
increasing numbers of sexual harassment suits.
This Note analyzes the diverse standards of liability currently ap-
plied to universities in cases of professor-student sexual harassment
under Title IX,1 and proposes a model standard of institutional liabil-
ity. Part I discusses the growing problem of sexual harassment in uni-
versities and the effects of this problem. This part also explains the
important differences between the university and elementary or sec-
ondary school environments, and it outlines the legal remedies that
are presently available to student-victims of sexual harassment on
campus. Part II focuses on Title IX, the federal statute intended to
remedy the problem of sexual harassment within educational institu-
tions. Title IX has created a great deal of debate, specifically because
courts have applied widely differing standards of institutional liability.
Thus, part II discusses where courts have turned for guidance in ap-
plying the statute, and how courts have ultimately attempted to dis-
cern the standard of liability specified by Title IX. In addition, part II
considers the Title IX standard of liability advanced by the Office for
Civil Rights in March, 1997.3
educational institutions for sexual harassment of students); Neera Rellan Stacy, Note,
Seeking a Superior Institutional Liability Standard Under Title IX for Teacher-Student
Sexual Harassment, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1338, 1340 (1996) (supporting a standard of
institutional liability based on agency principles).
21. Educator's Guide to Controlling Sexual Harassment, Dec., 1996. q 102, at 7
(Thompson Publishing Group, Inc.) [hereinafter Educator's Guide], see also Rosa H.,
106 F.3d at 657 (commenting that the court's docket has seen a large increase in sex-
ual harassment claims); Ellison, supra note 16, at 2060 (noting the "increase in sexual
harassment claims in the educational context" since 1992). In the 1998 Spring Term
alone, the Supreme Court will decide four cases involving sexual harassment: Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (holding that sex discrimina-
tion consisting of same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII); Ellerth v. Bur-
lington Indus., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997). cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998)
(deciding whether an employee threatened by a supervisor can bring suit even if she
suffered no retaliation); Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.).
cert granted, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (determining the standard of institutional liability
for a Title IX claim of sexual harassment of a high school student by a teacher);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.). cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438
(1997) (determining the standard of employer liability for a Title VII claim filed by a
female lifeguard based on allegations of sexual harassment committed by her
supervisors).
22. This Note focuses solely on sexual harassment between professor and student.
Title IX also addresses student against student (peer) sexual harassment which is also
a growing concern on university campuses. For an analysis of that issue, see Bernice
Resnick Sandler, Student to Student Sexual Harassmnent. in Sexual Harassment on
Campus, supra note 16. at 50.
23. Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students
by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997)
[hereinafter OCR Guidance]. The OCR Guidance includes the Supplementary Infor-
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Part III of this Note proposes a standard of liability that holds the
university liable for the harassing behavior of its professors, but con-
siders the preventative or corrective measures that the university may
have taken, and the degree of notice that the university may have had.
This Note introduces a liability standard-based on negligence-that
is most likely to reduce the occurrence of professor-student sexual
harassment. Further, the proposed standard should promote an insti-
tutional attitude of intolerance towards sexual harassment on campus.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES
The problem of sexual harassment is of national concern. 4 This
part examines the magnitude of the problem and the devastating ef-
fects that sexual harassment has on education. In addition, this part
highlights the need for a clear standard of institutional liability under
Title IX, a standard that should be unique to the university setting.
Lastly, this part will consider the remedial options that presently exist
for the student-victims of sexual harassment.
A. The Problem of Sexual Harassment and Its Effects
Sexual harassment on college and university campuses is not a new
problem.25 Nor is it a problem that has been ignored by legal and
educational authors.26 This attention, unfortunately, is well-war-
ranted. In a 1991 survey of undergraduate and graduate women stu-
mation section that introduces the Guidance. Id. at 12,034-12,038. The Office for Civil
Rights ("OCR") has the responsibility of interpreting and administering the rights
and protections granted by Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994). In its efforts to
fulfill this responsibility, the OCR's stated goal is clear: the elimination of sex-based
discrimination in federally assisted education programs. OCR Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg.
at 12,034. The Guidance is intended to provide educational institutions, from elemen-
tary school through graduate colleges and universities, with information addressing
the problems of sexual harassment. Id.
24. The recent developments involving President Clinton's alleged sexual miscon-
duct have thrust the issue of sexual harassment into the headlines and "have un-
leashed a torrent of debate about sexual harassment. ... Tamar Lewin, Debate
Centers on Definition of Harassment, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1998, at Al.
25. See Billie Wright Dziech & Linda Weiner, The Lecherous Professor: Sexual
Harassment on Campus 11 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter The Lecherous Professor] (pro-
claiming that since 1837, when Oberlin College became the first college campus to
accept women, it is likely that there have been male professors sexually harassing
women students).
26. The following is a sample of the literature that has been written on the issue of
sexual harassment in educational institutions: The Lecherous Professor, supra note
25; Sexual Harassment on College Campuses: Abusing the Ivory Power (Michele A.
Paludi ed., 2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter Ivory Power]; Thomas M. Melsheimer et al., The
Law of Sexual Harassment on Campus: A Work in Progress, 13 Rev. Litig. 529 (1994);
Stefanie H. Roth, Sex Discrimination 101: Developing a Title IX Analysis for Sexual
Harassment in Education, 23 J. Law and Educ. 459 (1994); Schneider, supra note 18;
Ellison, supra note 16.
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dents, 7 over thirty one percent of the women surveyed reported
having been harassed because of their gender by at least one instruc-
tor in college.'
Sexual harassment on campus has wide-ranging and destructive ef-
fects on the lives of those that it touches.2 9 First, the sexual harass-
ment has an impact upon the student-victim's behavior, especially as it
relates to her education: a student may avoid classes taught by certain
professors; she may change her major or educational program; she
may forsake research opportunities; or, she may change or forfeit edu-
cational and career plans.3" Sexual harassment on campus can also
have emotional and physical consequences for student-victims, includ-
ing: loss of self-esteem; anxiety attacks; weight fluctuation; sleep dep-
27. Louise Fitzgerald et al., Tire Incidence and Dimensions of Se.rual Harassment
in Academia and the Workplace, in Academic and Workplace Harassment: A Re-
source Manual 161, 181 (Michele A. Paludi & Richard B. Barickman eds., 1991).
This Note will use female pronouns to identify the student-victims of sexual harass-
ment and will use male pronouns to identify the perpetrators of sexual harassment
because those designations comport with the most common scenarios of sexual har-
assment. Title IX, however, protects both genders from the effects of sexual harass-
ment and prohibits sexual harassment by either gender. OCR Guidance, supra note
23, at 12,039.
28. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 27, at 181. The authors consider their figures to be
conservative estimates. Id. They explain that "gender harassment and seductive be-
haviors ... constitute what can be called condition of work (or education) harassment,
and ... create an offensive and often intimidating environment in which women must
work or study." Id.; see The Lecherous Professor, supra note 25, at 15 (providing
statistics which demonstrate that "20 to 30 percent of women students report they
have been sexually harassed by male faculty during their college years"); Bernice R.
Sandler & Robert J. Shoop, What Is Sexual Harassment?, in Sexual Harassment on
Campus, supra note 16, at 1, 13 (citing the same figures); see also Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 657 (5th Cir. 1997) ("[I1t is increasingly evi-
dent from our docket that sexual harassment. .. of students by teachers is not uncom-
mon and may be a widespread phenomenon.").
29. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 27, at 164 ("The practical costs of harassment
to the victim are quite dramatic and have been documented by both survey and quali-
tative research efforts."). For a thorough analysis of the effects of sexual harassment,
see Mary P. Koss, Changed Lives: Tire Psychological Impact of Serual Harassment, in
Ivory Power. Sexual Harassment on Campus 73 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1990).
Several commentators have recommended that students who were not themselves
the direct targets of the harassment but were affected by it should also have standing
to file sexual harassment claims. See, e.g., OCR Guidance, supra note 23, at 12,041
(explaining that a student can claim harassment based on behavior that was not di-
rected specifically to that student); Roth, supra note 26, at 504 (same).
30. Ivory Power, supra note 26, at 3; see also Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d
80, 85 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that after meeting with her parents and the dean, the
plaintiff decided to complete a semester at home rather than at the college); Kadiki v.
Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746,752-53 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting that
after the plaintiff was spanked by her biology professor, plaintiff explained that "she is
[now] reluctant to enter the life sciences building, avoids classes taught by male
professors and refrains from identifying herself in class"); Educator's Guide, supra
note 21, T 102, at 6; Koss, supra note 29, at 78.
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rivation; or, in extreme cases, suicidal tendencies.31 Lastly, sexual
harassment obstructs the socialization goals that universities strive to
achieve.32 Students who suffer, witness, hear of, or participate in sex-
ual harassment are more likely to identify sexual harassment as an
acceptable form of social conduct.33 This misguided "education" will
transfer to the student's life as worker, parent, spouse, and community
member.34
B. The Differences Between the University Environment and the
Elementary-Secondary School Environment
While a great deal of case law and academic writings address sexual
harassment in elementary and secondary schools, far less attention has
been paid to the specific problem of sexual harassment on university
and college campuses. 35 This is despite reports and statistics that evi-
dence a severe harassment problem within those institutions.36
The significant differences between sexual harassment in a univer-
sity and harassment in secondary and elementary schools underscore
the need for independent consideration of the university setting.37
31. Educator's Guide, supra note 21, 102, at 7; see also Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 84
(stating that the plaintiff sought counseling with the director of Iona's Counseling
Center after she was sexually harassed by Professor Palma).
32. See John Provost, Forewords to the Second Edition, in Ivory Power, supra note
26, at xxv, xxviii (explaining that "[t]he entire campus community ... [has] a moral
and ethical responsibility to value one another. They are to protect and cherish each
other's freedom for, bound as a community, they share a sense of obligation to one
another"); see also Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (N.D. Cal.
1996) ("The type of environment that is tolerated or encouraged by or at a school can
therefore send a particularly strong signal to, and serve as an influential lesson for, its
students." (quotations omitted)).
33. Karen Maitland Schilling & Ann Fuehrer, The Organizational Context of Sex-
ual Harassment, in Academic and Workplace Sexual Harassment, supra note 27, at
123, 123-24 (examining the manner in which "sexual harassment may be viewed as
appropriate behavior for men within the context of typical patterns of socialization by
members of institutions, particularly universities, in this society").
34. Id. at 123-25.
35. See, e.g., Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648
(5th Cir. 1997) (describing an unlawful sexual relationship between a high school
teacher and his fifteen year old student); Stacy, supra note 20, at 1340 n.11 ("This
Note focuses on sexual harassment of students by teachers in the context of elemen-
tary through high school."). But see Schneider, supra note 18 (examining sexual har-
assment in higher education); Ivory Power, supra note 26 (same).
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; Sandier & Shoop, supra note 16, at 1
("Although most.., faculty members ... do not harass, sexual harassment is a prob-
lem on every campus." (emphasis added)).
37. See Brief for Petitioners, available in 1998 WL 19745, at *20 n.11, Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to 106
F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.) (recognizing that "[tihe context of higher education... may raise
somewhat different issues than are raised by this case"); Melsheimer et al., supra note
26, at 541-43. The authors discuss whether "schoolchildren and students of higher
education should receive the same protections." Id. at 541. They state that there are
two categories of students: "(1) schoolchildren, and (2) students of higher education,"
[Vol. 662564
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First, the age of the students is a major difference:38 school children
are, with very few exceptions, minors, "as to whom the law universally
recognizes a limited capacity for judgement" 39 in contrast, university
students are, in nearly all situations, of legal majority age. When con-
fronted with the sexual abuse of a second grade girl, the social reac-
tions are, and the legal consequences should be,4" different from those
that result from the sexual harassment of a college student. 1
Second, unlike elementary and high school students, university stu-
dents are not legally required to attend post-secondary schools.42 The
mandatory attendance requirements of elementary and secondary stu-
dents, which remove children from the protection of their parents, ar-
guably place a greater obligation upon schools to protect those
children from physical and emotional harm, such as sexual
harassment.43
A third important distinction is the difference between the profes-
sor-student relationship and the school teacher-student relationship 44
The American Association of University Professors explains the pro-
and, thus, there should be separate analyses for the two categories of students. Id. at
542; see also Schneider, supra note 18, at 530 n.25 (noting that "[c]laims of sexual
harassment involving younger students may require different or additional policy and
analytical concerns"); Stacy, supra note 20, at 1340 n.11 (noting that "[h]arassment in
a college setting ... raise[s] different and distinct questions" from the context of
elementary school through high school).
38. See Brief for Petitioners at *20-21, Gebser (No. 96-1866); Melsheimer et al.,
supra note 26, at 543.
39. Brief for Petitioners at *20, Gebser (No. 96-1866).
40. See Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 952 (W.D. Tex. 1995)
("No opinion polls are necessary to get a fix on this question. The American public
has zero tolerance for sexual abuse of little girls, whether by teachers or others; their
Congress has zero tolerance as well; hence, Title IX reaches this conduct with the full
weight of its purpose."); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 & n.11
(1982) (warning that minority "is a time and condition of life when a person may be
most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage").
41. See Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14236, at *13 (N.D. I11. Sept. 29, 1995) (distinguishing a college-aged plaintiff's Title
IX claim of sexual harassment from plaintiffs' claims in Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified
School District, 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993), where plaintiffs were ten and
twelve year old girls who had been sexually molested).
42. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 3205.1.a (McKinney 1995). The New York statute
reads in part: "In each school district of the state, each minor from six to sixteen years
of age shall attend ... full time instruction." Id.; see also Brief for Petitioners at *21,
Gebser (No. 96-1866) (discussing the effects of mandatory attendance requirements);
Melsheimer et al., supra note 26, at 543 (same).
43. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 144 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1992)
(arguing that a constitutional duty exists, by virtue of mandatory attendance laws, for
schools to protect schoolchildren from harm).
44. Compare Schneider, supra note 18, at 551-52 (quoting a Yale University
Dean's Report viewing the university as "an academic community in which students
and faculty are related by strong bonds of intellectual dependence and trust"), wit)
Brief for Petitioners at *22, Gebser (No. 96-1866) (arguing that the youth and vulnera-
bility of elementary and high school students create an "in loco parentis" role for the
schools).
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fessor's significant ethical obligations to students: "Professors demon-
strate respect for students as individuals and adhere to their proper
roles as intellectual guides and counselors.... They protect their aca-
demic freedom. '4 5 In stark contrast, the elementary or secondary
school teacher often interacts with students on a level closely resem-
bling that of a parent towards a child.46
Yet another factor distinguishing the university-student from the
child-student is the relationship between a university and a professor
as compared to a school's relationship with a teacher. The university
creates a teaching environment in which the faculty is quite independ-
ent from the university.47 . This same freedom does not exist in ele-
mentary and secondary schools.48 A final distinction between the
university and the elementary or secondary school is society's dissimi-
lar views of these institutions. The university is a model environment
for growth, learning, and respect between faculty and students,49
whereas elementary and high schools are custodians of children and
responsible for their safety.5" These many differences suggest that
sexual harassment in the university be treated differently from sexual
harassment in elementary and secondary schools.
C. The Current Redress Options-Other Than Title IX
Currently, students who suffer sexual harassment at the hands of a
professor have limited options through which they may seek amends.
Title IX, the predominant vehicle for educational sexual harassment
claims, is discussed in part II. This section reviews some of the other
available options.
45. American Association of University Professors, Statement on Professional Eth-
ics, in AAUP Policy Documents & Reports 75, 76 (1990); see also Schneider, supra
note 18, at 552 (describing the relationship that exists between professor and student
as akin to a fiduciary-beneficiary relationship which requires the fiduciary "to act in
scrupulous good faith" (quotations omitted)).
46. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, avail-
able in 1998 WL 24199, at *19-20, Gebser (No. 96-1866).
47. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 569 (noting that because of the "strong tradi-
tion of academic freedom" granted professors, universities have limited control over
them).
48. See Brief for Petitioners at *23, Gebser (No. 96-1866) (arguing that a school
district has a "broad responsibility" for the conduct of teachers who care for the
school's "young students").
49. See Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1990)
(pointing out that "[tihe essentiality of freedom in the community of American uni-
versities is almost self-evident.... [Professors] and students must always remain free
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; other-
wise our civilization will stagnate and die" (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957))); Melsheimer et al., supra note 26, at 554 (describing the modern
university as a "collective educational enterprise").
50. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating
that, "[s]eparated from his or her parents .... the child's safety and well-being are
entrusted to school officials").
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1. State Claims
The student may have a state claim against the university under spe-
cific state laws which prohibit sexual harassment in educational insti-
tutions." In addition, student-victims of sexual harassment may file
civil suits based on common law torts. 2 Either infliction of emotional
distressS3 or negligent supervision,-' for instance, could provide the
basis for a state law tort claim. The main flaw with these forms of
redress, however, is the variance that exists from state to state in such
laws. Thus, the protection provided students would depend on the
locale of their school.55 In contrast, the application of one form of
redress increases uniformity among different jurisdictions and pro-
vides schools with a greater understanding of their role in remedying
sexual harassment.
2. Section 1983
Students may also bring suit for sexual harassment under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983,56 which prohibits anyone acting under color of state
law from depriving individuals of any right secured by the Constitu-
tion.5 7 These rights include being free from discrimination on the ba-
sis of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex.5" Section 1983,
51. See National Advisory Council on Women's Educational Programs, The Re-
port on Sexual Harassment on Campus, in The Lecherous Professor, supra note 25, at
192, 192-93 (listing state civil rights laws as a possible remedy to sexual harassment);
Educator's Guide, supra note 21, 340, at 47.
52. Educator's Guide, supra note 21, 1 360, at 65.
53. See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (filing suit against school district for "intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress" as a result of sexual harassment she suffered).
54. See, eg., R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist., 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1529 (W.D. Okla.
1993) (ruling on a sexual harassment claim in which plaintiff relied on Oklahoma state
tort law to allege that defendant school "breach[ed] ... their duties to use reasonable
care in the hiring and retention of employees" (internal quotation omitted)). In addi-
tion, state claims may be based on assault and battery, see, e.g., Coleman v. Wirtz, No.
92314, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 920, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan 13, 1993) (noting that the district
court dismissed plaintiff's state claim of assault and battery against a high school prin-
cipal), or invasion of privacy. See Educator's Guide, supra note 21, 91 360, at 65.
55. See Educator's Guide, supra note 21, 1 340, at 47; id. Appendix III (providing
a state by state survey of the existing state statutes specifically prohibiting sexual har-
assment); The Report on Sexual Harassment on Campus, National Advisory Council
on Women's Educational Programs, in The Lecherous Professor, supra note 25, at
192, 192-93.
56. For a thorough analysis of § 1983 as a remedy to claims of sexual harassment
in education, see Jeff Homer, A Student's Right to Protection from Violence and Ser-
ual Abuse in the School Environment, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 45 (1995).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Vest Supp. 1998); see Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City
Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1459 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("In order to state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 1) the deprivation of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law.").
58. See Stephen J. Shapiro, Section 1983 Claims to Redress Discrimination in Pub-
lic Employment: Are They Preempted by Ttie VII?, 35 Am. U. L Rev. 93, 98 (1985).
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however, applies only when the public entity's official policies are dis-
criminatory.59 Thus, the student-plaintiff must demonstrate that the
accused is the "final decision-maker .... It is not enough that an
employee of the.., entity.., caused a violation of Section 1983. Such
an action alone would not subject the educational institution ... to
liability. 6
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has stated that, "[t]o establish a claim
against the school district, [appellant] must show... the existence of a
continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional con-
duct, as well as deliberate indifference or tacit authorization and causa-
tion. '61 The Educator's Guide to Controlling Sexual Harassment
notes that the "deliberate indifference" standard is a major obstacle to
recovery under § 1983.62 One court has further characterized § 1983
as "a statute that opens a narrow and limited window for recovery in
cases where governmental entities or actors are involved in constitu-
tional deprivations. ' 63 Therefore, the requirements of a § 1983 claim
prevent it from being a practical remedy for teacher-student sexual
harassment in the educational setting.'
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, state claims and § 1983
claims are both incapable of providing individual student-victims with
effective protection and recovery from sexual harassment. Thus, stu-
dent-victims, as well as courts, must look to Title IX, as Congress
intended.
II. TITLE IX AND CURRENT LIABILITY STANDARDS OF
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex by any educa-
tional institution that receives federal financial assistance, or by any
59. See Educator's Guide, supra note 21, 390, at 99.
60. Id. at 100; see Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 144 (5th Cir. 1992)
(asserting that supervisory officials will not be liable under § 1983 "on a respondeat
superior theory" and "[o]nly their direct acts or omissions can form the basis for lia-
bility" (citations omitted)).
61. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467 (8th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
62. Educator's Guide, supra note 21, 390, at 100.
63. Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 952 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
64. At least one court, however, has entertained a claim for sexual harassment
based on § 1983 against supervisory school officials. Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City
Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (permitting plaintiff to enforce a
§ 1983 action against certain individual defendants for the sexual harassment she suf-
fered and analyzing defendants' liability based on § 1983 rules). It is significant to
note, however, that the plaintiff in Oona R.-S. relied on Title IX-as her right secured
by the Constitution-to enforce § 1983. Id. at 1459-60. This creates the undesired
situation of Title IX actions being converted into § 1983 actions. See Leija, 887 F.
Supp. at 952 ("[Tihere should be no requirement that the limitations of section 1983
should be transferred to Title IX .... Otherwise, Title IX actions are transformed
into section 1983 actions .... Certainly, the Congress did not intend to enact Title IX
to duplicate section 1983.").
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institution whose students receive federal financial aid.e5 The follow-
ing Part of this Note examines claims of Title LX sexual harassment
and documents the courts' struggle to discern an appropriate standard
of institutional liability. This Part considers where courts have looked
for guidance in applying the statute, and how courts have ultimately
attempted to formulate a coherent standard of liability.
A. History of Title IX: An Attempt to Prevent Se.rual Harassment
Through the enactment of Title IX, "Congress sought to eliminate
invidious discrimination on the basis of sex in educational institu-
tions '6 6 and looked to provide the federal government with an instru-
ment to achieve that goal.67 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,' the
Supreme Court probed the "genesis of Title IX," and noted that the
statute was specifically established to respond to the problem of sex-
ual discrimination within educational institutions.69 The Court also
identified two primary objectives of Title IX: "[flirst, Congress
wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices; second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective
protections against those practices."70 Consistent with these objec-
tives, the Court held that Title IX creates an implied private right of
action for an individual's claim of sex discrimination in the educa-
tional context.71
To establish a prima facie case of sexual discrimination under Title
IX, "a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she was excluded from par-
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). According to the Educator's Guide. -ivlirtually all
public and private institutions of higher education are covered [by Title IX]." Educa-
tor's Guide, supra note 21, T 330, at 29.
The OCR has established certain procedures that recipients of Title IX funds are to
implement and the actions that the OCR can take for violations of Title IX. 34 C.F.R.
§§ 106.3-106.9 (1994). These include: conducting evaluations of the institution's poli-
cies and practices, id. § 106.3(c)(1); designating at least one employee to be responsi-
ble for Title IX issues within the institution, id. § 106.8(a); adopting and publishing
grievance procedures for complaints of Title LX violations, id. § 106.8(b); and, notify-
ing all relevant parties that the institution abides by the requirements of Title IX. Id.
§ 106.9.
66. Charles J. Russo et al., Sexual Harassment and Student Rights: The Supreme
Court Expands Title IX Remedies, 75 Ed. L. Rep. 733, 739 (1992) (citing Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 n.16 (1979)).
67. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704 n.36 ("[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive mea-
sure which... is needed if we are to provide women with solid legal protection as
they seek education and training for later careers" (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5806-5807
(1972) (comment of Sen. Bayh) (alteration in original))); see Russo et al., supra note
66, at 733.
68. 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (involving a plaintiff who claimed that the defendant, a
medical school, denied her admission because of her gender).
69. Id at 694 n.16.
70. Id at 704.
71. Id. at 717. An implied private right of action allows private litigants, as well as
the federal government, to file a cause of action to support their statutory rights even
though the statute does not expressly provide a cause of action. See id.
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ticipation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination in
an educational program; (2) that the program receives federal assist-
ance; and (3) that the exclusion from the program was on the basis of
sex. "72
In 1992, Title IX truly became a "viable legal tool for eliminating
sexual harassment in education. '73 That year, the Supreme Court de-
cided Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.74 This decision,
building upon the Cannon holding, made it possible for students who
were victims of sexual discrimination to sue the school for monetary
damages for failure to enforce Title IX.75 The Court discerned an in-
tent by Congress to provide all appropriate remedies, including dam-
ages, for a suit brought under the statute.76 Further, the Court did not
equivocate in its belief that sexual harassment is prohibited under Ti-
tle IX, and, therefore, may be the basis for a damages claim:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Schools
the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a super-
visor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." We be-
lieve the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses
and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for federal
monies to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought
by statute to proscribe.77
The Franklin Court also made an important distinction between
"unintentional" and "intentional" Title IX violations, particularly as
the distinction relates to an educational institution's "notice that it will
be liable for a monetary award. '78 The Court acknowledged that, typ-
72. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bougher v.
University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 143-44 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 882 F.2d 74 (3d
Cir. 1989)).
73. Roth, supra note 26, at 468.
74. 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (hearing a case in which Franklin, a high school student,
claimed she was subjected to continual sexual harassment from a sports coach and
teacher employed by the school district): see Ellison, supra note 16, at 2060 (stating
that the Franklin decision "provided the most significant impetus" for the surge in
Title IX sexual harassment claims).
75. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76; see also Barbara Watts, Legal Issues, in Ivory Power,
supra note 26, at 9, 18 ("Until Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the relief
available-the withdrawal of federal funds from the institutions-provided little satis-
faction and no financial compensation to a student suffering the mental and emotional
distress caused by sexual harassment."); Russo et al., supra note 66, at 739 ("No
longer acceptable is the practice of simply dismissing a teacher who sexually harassed
a student and then pretending the problem never existed.").
76. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66 (holding that absent Congress's clear direction other-
wise, federal courts have the power to "use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done" in a cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute (quoting Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946))).
77. Id. at 75 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (altera-
tion in original)). But see Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011
n.11 (5th Cir. 1996) (construing this language as "pure dictum").
78. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74.
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icaily, the remedies available for unintentional violations of a Spend-
ing Clause statute79 by the receiving entity are limited because the
entity does not have notice that it will be monetarily liable for such
violations.' 0 Title IX, however, differs from the normal rule. Because
the statute established an affirmative duty on schools to not discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex, which includes acts of teacher-student sexual
harassment, the Court reasoned that harassing behavior must be con-
sidered an intentional violation of Title IX. Thus, the receiving entity
can be found monetarily liable for those violations."1 Accordingly,
student victims of sexual harassment seeking money damages under
Title IX are not constrained by the general rule prohibiting recovery
for unintentional violations of Spending Clause statutesb 2
B. Confusion Over Institutional Liability Under Title IX
The Franklin decision leaves unanswered many important questions
relating to the standard of institutional liability under Title IX."
There has been continued confusion over an educational institution's
liability for Title IX claims of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment.84 The Supreme Court has recognized this confusion and incon-
sistency, and in December, 1997, the Court granted certiorari in Doe
79. Congress enacted Title IX through its Spending Clause powers. Id. at 74-75;
see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The clause reads in part: "The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States[.]" U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
80. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75 (reflecting on Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981)). Spending Clause statutes are akin to creating a
contract: "[In return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981).
81. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75; see also Roth, supra note 26, at 471 (concluding that
the Supreme Court based its entire decision in Franklin on the premise that teacher-
student sexual harassment is an intentional violation of Title IX).
82. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75; see also Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F.
Supp. 1415, 1422 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claims are, by definition, intentionally discriminatory).
83. For instance: the Court does not address the specific standard of liability to
which a receiving entity will be held for intentional violations of Title IX; the Court
does not address whether the entity may avoid liability if it demonstrates efforts to
prevent the sexual harassment; nor does the Court address whether the receiving en-
tity must have knowledge of the intentional violations in order to be held liable. See
Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393,400 (5th Cir. 1996) (listing a number
of issues that the sparse wording of Title IX fails to address and which Franklin had
not resolved).
84. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting
that, "courts that have discussed the standard of liability for school districts under
Title IX have failed to reach a consensus regarding the appropriate standard"); Bolon
v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (E.D. Mo. 1996) ("The standard of a
school district's liability for sexual harassment by teachers against students under Title
IX is not clear.").
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v. Lago Vista Independent School District.5 In Lago Vista, petition-
ers' question presented asks, "What is the proper standard of liability
of a school district under Title IX... for a teacher's sexual harassment
of a pupil?"'
6
Notwithstanding the Court's ultimate decision, however, Lago
Vista, which considers the liability standard of a secondary school,
should not resolve the particular problem that courts confront with
university setting professor-student sexual harassment in Title IX cases
such as Kracunas v. Iona College. 7 Whomever looks to deviate from
the standard that the Court may establish in Lago Vista should be able
to forcefully argue that universities differ significantly from elemen-
tary and high schools,88 and that, as a result, the standard of institu-
tional liability must consider the university's distinct "liability
calculus."89
C. The Courts Look for Answers
Because the standard of institutional liability under Title IX is so
imprecise, courts have looked to Title V19 ° and Title VII9 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 for guidance.9" The following sections examine
liability standards that courts have imported into Title IX.
85. 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866). In
this case, petitioner is seeking damages from a school district for Title IX violations
committed by a ninth grade teacher of petitioner. Id. at 1224. Because of the many
differences between universities and elementary and secondary schools, the Supreme
Court's pending decision in Lago Vista should not be considered binding in cases of
sexual harassment between university professor and student. See Brief for Petitioners,
available in 1998 WL 19745, at *23-24, Gebser (No. 96-1866) (arguing for institutional
liability based on factors that are nearly entirely absent in colleges and universities:
the psychological and physical immaturity of the minor students; the wide age differ-
ential between students and teachers; the compulsory attendance rules of elementary
and secondary schools; and the tradition of the school's role, "in loco parentis"); see
also supra Part I.B (discussing the differences between the higher education environ-
ment and the environment in elementary and secondary schools).
Because of the limited case law and literature pertaining to professor-student sex-
ual harassment in post-secondary educational institutions, however, this Note will rely
on courts' analysis of harassment that occurred in elementary and secondary schools.
Important differences between the educational settings will be noted where necessary.
86. Brief for Petitioners at *i, Gebser (No.96-1866).
87. 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Lago
Vista will offer guidance to determine the appropriate standard of liability for univer-
sity violations of Title IX.
88. See Melsheimer et al., supra note 26, at 543-44; supra Part I.B.
89. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, available
in 1998 WL 24199, at *20 n.14, Gebser (No. 96-1866).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
92. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (relying on
Title VI for the limited purpose of supporting its decision to permit private rights of
action in Title IX cases); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243,
248 (2d Cir. 1995) (relying on Title VII for resolution of issues in a Title IX case).
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1. Title VI
Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race by recipients of fed-
eral funds.93 The Supreme Court has stated that Title IX was "pat-
terned" after Title VI,94 and several courts have held accordingly.95 In
Cannon, the Court explained how Title IX was originally designed as
an amendment to Title VI, and noted that Title IX simply substitutes
"sex" for Title VI's "race, color, or national origin."96 In addition,
Congress enacted Title VI, like Title IX, under its Spending Clause
power.97
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of New
York,98 a divided Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must demon-
strate two elements to prove a Title VI violation: (1) discriminatory
intent; and (2) discriminatory effect. 9 One commentator has ex-
plained that institutional liability under Title VI requires the institu-
tion's "direct involvement, and even notice would not impute liability
to the educational facility."' 0 When applied to sexual harassment
cases then, notice of the sexual harassment, either constructive or ac-
tual, would not be sufficient to find liability "absent direct involve-
ment by the school district."'' 1
The difficulty in proving actual discriminatory intent may provide
one reason why few courts have addressed the issue of liability for
federal fund recipients in violation of Title VI. 10 2 This is in contrast to
Title VII, under which the courts have more fully developed employer
liability.0 3 Moreover, because Title VII specifically addresses gender
93. Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
94. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694.
95. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.14 (5th Cir. 1996);
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing
Cannon to support its similar interpretations of Title VI and Title IX).
96. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694 n.16, 694-95; compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (Title
VI), with 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994) (Title IX).
97. See supra notes 79-80 for a discussion of Spending Clause statutes.
98. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
99. Id at 607 n.27.
100. Elizabeth G. Livingston, Canutillo Independent School District v. Leija: Im-
puting Liability for Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment Under Title IX, 71 Tul. L Rev.
1849, 1854 (1997).
101. Canutillo Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 1996).
102. See Roth, supra note 26, at 475 ("[T]he issue of fund recipient liability for
[Title VI] discrimination by individual employees has been infrequently litigated.").
But see Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871, 881 (1st Cir. 1987) (remanding a summaryjudgement for the defendant, the United States Postal Service, based on plaintiff's
Title VI claim that the Postal Service discriminated on the basis of race through the
actions of its supervisors).
103. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L
Rev. 691, 692 (1997) (examining the evolution of sexual harassment law under Title
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discrimination, 114 much of the case law relating to claims of sexual
harassment has developed under this statute. 05 Thus, courts have
more frequently looked to Title VII when interpreting Title IX
claims.10 6
2. Title VII
Title VII makes it unlawful for an "employer ... to discriminate
against any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . sex."107
Students may seek the protection of Title VII only if they are also an
employee of the school or university. 10 8 The fundamental concepts of
sexual harassment law evolved from Title VII.109 Under Title VII,
there are two types of sexual harassment claims: (1) quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment, which occurs when "submission to or rejection of [un-
welcome sexual] conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual;""' and (2) hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment, which exists "[w]hen the workplace is
permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that
is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the vic-
tim's employment."'"
VII, and noting that "each year the federal courts entertain hundreds of sexual har-
assment claims under Title VII").
104. See infra note 107 and accompanying text for Title VII's relevant language.
105. Franke, supra note 103, at 692; see also Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch.
Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (recognizing that there is much more
case law involving sex discrimination claims under Title VII than under Title VI, and
that in resolving these kinds of claims appellate courts have relied much more on Title
VII).
106. See Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1292 (relying on Title VII case law, specifically,
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). This Note will also rely on Title
VII claims, rather than Title VI claims, as the primary source of comparison for the
Title IX standards that the Note analyzes and ultimately proposes.
107. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Congress enacted Title VII under the author-
ity of the Commerce Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that: "Congress shall
have power ... to regulate Commerce"); see Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry
Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 1997).
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sex with respect to the "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment"); Robert J. Shoop, The Legal Context of Sexual Harassment on Campus, in
Sexual Harassment on Campus, supra note 16, at 22, 29.
109. See Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1290 ("The entire legal theory of sexual harass-
ment has been developed in the context of Title VII.").
110. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1997).
111. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)). In the Title IX context, the same two forms of
sexual harassment have been recognized as actionable by the OCR. OCR Guidance,
supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,038. For purposes of this Note, discussion will focus
almost entirely on claims of hostile environment sexual harassment. See id. (defining
hostile environment sexual harassment as: "conduct ... that is sufficiently severe,
persistent, or pervasive to... create a hostile or abusive educational environment").
This is due, primarily, to two factors. First, courts and commentators are almost unan-
imous in finding that strict liability governs claims of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
See id. at 12,039 ("[A] school will always be liable for even one instance of quid pro
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There are five basic elements to a hostile environment sexual har-
assment claim under Title VI1.111 First, the employee-victim must be a
member of a protected group, which is satisfied by simply stipulating
to plaintiffs gender. 13 Second, the plaintiff must have been subject to
harassment, such as unwelcome sexual advances or remarks." 4 Third,
the alleged harassment was based on sex and would not have occurred
but for plaintiffs sex."' Fourth, the harassment was sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment.1 1 6  Finally, the employee must establish a basis for the
employer's liability. 17
Employer liability under Title VII is, in large part, determined by
the employment position of the perpetrator in relation to both the
victim and the employer. Thus, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC")," 8 through the use of agency principles, ar-
gues that the employer should be held strictly liable in all cases of quid
pro quo sexual harassment."19 As the Second Circuit noted, this is
"[b]ecause the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, wields the em-
quo harassment by a school employee in a position of authority ... whether or not it
knew, should have known, or approved of the harassment at issue."); infra notes 119-
20 and accompanying text. Second, hostile environment harassment is -the most per-
vasive form of sexual harassment," and, within the university setting, it is the form of
harassment that is "most often defended on the grounds of 'academic freedom."' Mi-
chele A. Paludi & Richard Barickman, Sexual Harassment of Students: Victims of tie
College Experience, in Academic and Workplace Sexual Harassment, supra note 27, at
145, 148.
112. See Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1993); 1
Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and Practice § 6.44, at 284-
304 (2d ed. 1994); Baker, supra note 20, at 289. Title IX employs the same basic
elements to claims of hostile environment sexual harassment in the education context.
See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463,467-68 (8th Cir. 1996). In Kinnian,
the Eighth Circuit stated that plaintiff must show:
1) that she belongs to a protected group; 2) that she was subject to unwel-
come sexual harassment; 3) that the harassment was based on sex: 4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions
of her education and create an abusive educational environment: and 5) that
some basis for institutional liability has been established.
Id. at 467-68 (citing Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996)).
113. See Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1042; Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th
Cir. 1986).
114. Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1042; Roth, supra note 26, at 486.
115. Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1042; Roth, supra note 26, at 487.
116. Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1042; see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986) ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must ... 'alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'" (quoting
Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (alteration in original))).
117. Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1042; Roth, supra note 26, at 485.
118. The EEOC is the governing body that effectuates the policies of Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).
119. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71. The Supreme Court, referring to the amicus
brief submitted by the EEOC, explained, and seemed to support, the EEOC's posi-
tion on quid pro quo sexual harassment as: "where a supervisor exercises the author-
ity actually delegated to him by his employer, by making or threatening to make
decisions affecting the employment status of his subordinates, such actions are prop-
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ployer's authority to alter the terms and conditions of employment-
either actually or apparently" over the employee-victim. 2
For hostile environment sexual harassment claims, however, the
employer's standard of liability is not so clear.121 As the EEOC ex-
plains, this is because with such claims "the usual basis for a finding of
agency [between employer and harasser] will often disappear.' 22 The
Supreme Court, therefore, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 123 -
which established hostile environment sexual harassment as an action-
able claim under Title VII124-declined "to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability. ' 125 Nevertheless, the Court did state that employ-
ers will not be automatically liable for the hostile environment created
by their supervisors.1 26 Conversely, it also held that an employer's
lack of notice and the existence of a grievance procedure does not
insulate an employer from liability.' 27 The Court ultimately found
that Congress intended the "courts to look to agency principles for
guidance in this area.' 128
As a result of Meritor's directive to determine employer liability for
hostile environment sexual harassment based on agency principles,
courts have distinguished between harassment committed by supervi-
sors and harassment perpetrated by coworkers.' 29 If the harasser is in
a supervisory position in relation to the victim, then the employer is
liable if the "supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to fur-
ther the harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the
erly imputed to the employer whose delegation of authority empowered the supervi-
sor to undertake them." Id. at 70; EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1997).
120. Karibian v.Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 779 ("Unfortunately, the 'specific basis' of employer liability for a hostile
work environment remains elusive.").
122. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71. The Court again refers to the EEOC to explain that
hostile environment claims, unlike quid pro quo claims, are not based on employment
related threats or rewards made by a supervisor to an employee-victim. See id. at 70-
71. Thus, the direct link between supervisor and employer-whose delegation of su-
pervisory authority made the threats or rewards possible-does not exist. Id.
123. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
124. Id. at 73.
125. Id. at 72. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall emphatically opposed the
creation of two distinct standards of liability: one for hostile environment sexual har-
assment, and one for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Id. at 77 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). Justice Marshall declared that sexual harassment predicated on a supervisor's
responsibility for "the work environment and with ensuring a safe, productive work-
place," should not result in liability any less severe than harassment predicated on a
supervisor's abuse of his power to "hire, fire, and discipline." Id. at 76 (Marshall, J.,
concurring)
126. Id. at 72.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1994) ("It will
certainly be relevant to the analysis ... that the alleged harasser is the plaintiff's
supervisor rather than her co-worker.").
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harassment by the existence of the agency relationship."'" If the har-
assment is committed by a coworker, the employer will be liable only
if "the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint
or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it."131 Because of
the unique facts that comprise an employment-setting sexual harass-
ment claim, the difficulty in transferring agency principles to that envi-
ronment, 132 and the fact that agency principles can support many
different theories of liability,133 courts have continued to struggle,
however, with applying a uniform standard of employer liability, par-
ticularly in cases of supervisor-employee hostile environment sexual
harassment cases. 3
130. Id. at 780; see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1997); Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 219 (1958) [hereinafter Restatement] which provides as follows:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accom-
plishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id
131. Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir.
1992); see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1997).
132. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (noting that -[agency]
principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII").
133. Roth, supra note 26, at 490-95 (noting that agency principles can support both
negligence, based on either actual or constructive notice, or strict liability).
This lack of uniformity will be addressed by the Supreme Court in Faragher i' City
of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997) (No. 97-
282). Faragher, a Title VII claim which will be heard in the Spring Term, 1998, may
establish a clear standard of employer liability for supervisor-employee hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment. Specifically, the Petitioner seeks answers to the follow-
ing questions:
I. Is an employer, pursuant to common-law principles of agency, responsible
for hostile-environment sexual harassment committed by supervisory em-
ployees who use their supervisory status to effectuate the harassment?
II. May a fact-finder infer notice to an employer of hostile-environment sex-
ual harassment:
A. through actual notice to an intermediate supervisor, who reports it no
further?
B. from the same pervasive nature of the harassment that makes it
actionable?
C. by default through its failure to effectively disseminate any sexual harass-
ment policy... ?
Petitioner's Brief, available in 1997 WL 793076, at *i, Faragher (No. 97-282).
134. See Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1535 (citing cases from a number of circuits that have
each applied different tests for employer liability); Roth, supra note 26, at 490 (noting
that, under Title VII, "courts have struggled with developing appropriate rules of lia-
bility and no one rule or approach has prevailed").
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One important characteristic of Title VII, which is particularly rele-
vant to the issue of institutional liability, is the statutory cap limiting
an employer's liability.'35 This helps ensure that private actions
against entities in violation of Title VII do not become excessive. 136
The recovery cap does not, however, include Title IX.137 This may be
because Congress passed the statute in 1991, a year prior to the Frank-
lin decision which opened the door to monetary damages for Title IX
claims.138 One consequence of not having a cap on Title IX liability
damages is that courts must strongly consider the potential "for Title
IX suits to bankrupt school districts."' 39
3. The Transfer of Title VII to Title IX
Despite the unsettled Title VII standards for employer liability,
courts often apply Title VII principles when confronted with Title IX
claims of hostile environment sexual harassment. 4 ° This may be due
to the similar hierarchical nature of the employment environment and
the educational environment.' 4 ' As one commentator has noted, both
environments are the "locus of relationships of unequal power.' 142 In
addition, there is a large amount of Title VII case law which can fill
the void left by the relatively few Title IX cases that have been liti-
gated.143 Lastly, courts have looked to Title VII because they have
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin-which turned
to Meritor, a Title VII case-as directing them to hold educational
institutions to the same standard of liability as employers are held in
Title VII cases.1"
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). The maximum amount of compensatory damages
recoverable under the statute is $300,000. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
136. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1997).
137. Id. at 657 n.4.
138. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
139. Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 955 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
This court found for the plaintiff and limited damages to expenses for medical and
mental health treatment, and to special education. Id. at 956; see also infra note 315
(discussing the need for a Title IX cap); cf. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 657 n.4 (arguing that
the absence of a cap may suggest that "Congress did not view Title IX as the kind of
legislation that could generate expansive liability").
140. See, e.g., Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1997) (deciding not
to deviate from the liability standard established in Title VII cases, although the court
recognized several distinctions between Title VII and Title IX claims); Kinman v.
Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996) (extending the application of
"Title VII standards of institutional liability to hostile environment sexual harassment
cases involving a teacher's harassment of a student").
141. See Roth, supra note 26, at 500.
142- Id.
143 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248-49
(2d Cir. 1995) (noting Franklin's citation of Meritor in support of its decision to apply
Title VII liability standards to Title IX) (citations omitted). But see Rosa H., 106 F.3d
at 656 (deciding that one reference to Meritor cannot be interpreted as a directive by
the Supreme Court to fully adopt Title VII liability standards into Title IX cases).
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The application of Title VII to Title IX, however, creates confusion
and varying liability standards as courts ruling on Title IX violations
try to find a Title VII hostile environment liability standard that fits
Title IX. 145 Moreover, there are significant differences between the
sexual harassment actionable under Title VII and that which is action-
able under Title IX. First, "students, unlike employees, are by nature
transient."'" This may dissuade students from seeking remedial ac-
tion against the university, and it may cause them to sense that the
university has a greater commitment to its professors than to the stu-
dents. 47 Second, the benefits that students receive-such as, recom-
mendations, future employment opportunities, intellectual and
emotional growth-are not as readily obvious as the benefits received
by employees. 148 This creates a problem in which a student may feel
that a professor is implicitly threatening or forcing her to accept the
sexual harassing conduct based on the intangible benefits over which a
professor has power.149 Another factor that distinguishes a Title VII
case from a Title IX case is the deference that courts have tradition-
ally shown to the activities of colleges and universities, a deference the
courts have not typically shown non-educational institutions.s
A final factor that differentiates claims brought under the two stat-
utes is their statutory language. In outlining the coverage of the stat-
ute, Title VII, unlike Title IX, expressly defines "employer" to include
agents of the employer.iSl Thus, at least one court has argued that
this implies that "Title IX does not instruct courts to impose liability
based on anything other than the acts of the recipients of federal
funds."' 2 Yet, Title IX regulations, unlike Title VII's, do require edu-
cational institutions to adopt specific procedures in order to affirma-
tively handle issues of sexual harassment.5 3 This difference may
suggest that "Congress perceived a need for broader protection
145. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of a
uniform standard of Title VII liability). Compare Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469 (applying, in
a hostile environment sexual harassment case, a Title VII standard that is interpreted
as a negligence or "knew or should have known" standard), with Kracunas, 119 F.3d
at 87 (applying, in a hostile environment sexual harassment case, a Title VII standard
that is based on agency principles which disregards the knowledge of the institution).
146. Schneider, supra note 18, at 527. This factor seems particularly relevant in
higher education where students are usually at a school for four years or less, whereas
a younger student can remain in a specific school district from first through twelfth
grades-twelve years.
147. Id. at 527-28.
148. Id. at 528.
149. See Roth, supra note 26, at 502-03.
150. Schneider, supra note 18, at 528 & n.14 (citing to several Supreme Court cases
in which the Court refused to override a university's decision relating to an internal
matter).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
152. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997).
153. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.3-106.9 (1997); Schneider, supra note 18, at 544-45; see supra
note 65 (noting the regulatory language).
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against discriminatory behavior in the academic context than in the
employment context.' 1 54 As a result of these differences, the Fifth
Circuit has retreated from incorporating Title VII into IX, 155 and a
federal court in Missouri has completely rejected applying Title VII in
Title IX cases.1 56
D. Ways That A University May Be Found Liable Under Title IX
Whether a court employs a Title VI analysis, a Title VII analysis, or
an independent Title IX analysis, courts will essentially select from
two main theories of liability: (1) strict liability, which has been ap-
plied in Title IX cases and Title VII quid pro quo cases;157 or (2) negli-
gence, based on actual or constructive notice, which courts have again
applied in Title IX and Title VII cases. 158 Thus, courts must first de-
termine whether they will require plaintiffs to prove that the institu-
tion had knowledge-actual or constructive-of the harassment in
order to impute liability: if a court does not require a school to have
knowledge of the harassment, it would apply a strict liability standard;
if a court does require a school to have knowledge, it would apply a
negligence standard.
Neither the language of Title IX nor of Title VII establishes a par-
ticular standard of institutional liability for violation of their direc-
tives. Thus, the remainder of Part II examines courts' decisions and
commentators' opinions regarding the knowledge requirement, and
how courts have applied the strict liability and the negligence theories
in cases of hostile environment sexual harassment arising under Title
IX.
154. Schneider, supra note 18, at 545.
155. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 656.
156. Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp 1423, 1429 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (deciding,
in a Title IX case, that the Title VII standard of institutional liability for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment, interpreted as a "knew or should have known" standard,
is inapplicable). See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text for the Bolon court's
specific reasons why it rejected the "knew or should have known" standard.
It is also significant to note that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, for the
same Term, to a Title VII case and a Title IX case, which both focus on the issue of
institutional liability. The Court's intent is not clear. It may look to take Title IX
cases off of the Title VII track that lower courts have relied on since Franklin v.
Gwinnett. Alternatively, the court may look to confirm Title IX's reliance on Title
VII.
157. See Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992) (Title
VII); Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1428 (Title IX).
158. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998) (Title VII); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d
463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996) (Title IX).
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1. No Institutional Knowledge Necessary for Liability: Imposing
Strict Liability
Strict liability imposes liability upon any federally funded educa-
tional institution for the sexual harassment of a student by a teacher,
regardless of whether the school "knew or should have known" about
the harassment. 159 Thus, if a student-victim successfully establishes
"that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to interfere with
her educational opportunities and create a hostile, offensive or intimi-
dating learning environment" then the school shall be automatically
liable.160
The use of agency principles, specifically Restatement of Agency
§ 219(2)(d), reaches a similar result to strict liability by directly imput-
ing liability upon the school for the actions of its agent, the teacher. 16 1
Because courts and commentators often rely on agency principles as
an authoritative source for their Title IX institutional liability stan-
dard, 62 it is necessary to first analyze the specific arguments that sup-
port and oppose the use of agency principles, and then to examine the
appropriateness of strict institutional liability under Title IX.
a. Looking to Agency Principles: Support for Institutional Liability
The focus of agency principles is on the actual or apparent authority
that a teacher wields over his students as a result of his relationship
159. Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1428; Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist.. 887 F. Supp.
947, 953 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
160. Roth, supra note 26, at 505.
161. See supra note 130 for the language of the Restatement of Agency § 219(2)(d).
There is often a great deal of overlap between agency principles and strict liability.
See Stacy, supra note 20, at 1380 (recognizing that a standard premised on agency
principles will raise similar arguments as strict liability). One author, in discussing
institutional liability, writes of a standard of "strict vicarious liability." Schneider,
supra note 18, at 568.
162. See Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1997); Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140, 142 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rer'd, 106 F.3d 648
(5th Cir. 1997); OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,039. Typically, courts
and commentators employ either Restatement of Agency § 219(2)(b) or § 219(2)(d)
as a basis of support for a particular standard of liability. See Kractnas, 119 F.3d at 87
(applying Restatement § 219(2)(d)); Rosa H., 887 F. Supp. at 143 (applying Restate-
ment § 219(2)(b)); Brief for Petitioners, available in 1998 WL 19745, at *36, Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to 106
F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.) (applying § 219(2)(d)); Stacy, supra note 20, at 1342 (same). Ap-
plication of § 219(2)(b) is akin to a negligence standard, Rosa H., 887 F. Supp. at 143
(employing § 219(2)(b) and requiring a negligence finding upon the school to create
liability), while application of § 219(2)(d) is analogous to a standard of strict liability.
See infra note 205 and accompanying text (noting the Fifth Circuit's concern over
§ 219(2)(d)); Stacy, supra note 20, at 1379 (recognizing that use of § 219(21(d) is "tan-
tamount to strict liability"). The arguments for and against the use of agency princi-
ples-either § 219(2)(b) or § 219(2)(d)-as a source to support a particular
institutional liability standard, however, are essentially the same.
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with the school. 163 Thus, for a school to be held liable for teacher-
student hostile environment sexual harassment based on agency prin-
ciples, a plaintiff must establish that the teacher was acting in a super-
visory manner, or that he was aided in the harassment by his
relationship with the school. 1"4
i. Arguments for the Use of Agency Principles
The courts and commentators that advance the use of agency princi-
ples to determine institutional liability under Title IX for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment 165 offer several specific arguments to
163. See OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,039 (defining agency princi-
ples as, "principles governing the delegation of authority to or authorization of an-
other person to act on one's behalf"). Although the Second Circuit neither refers nor
cites to agency principles in Kracunas, it uses language that mimics the Restatement
of Agency. See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 88; supra note 130 (reciting the language of the
Restatement). The court ultimately applies a liability standard, stating that: "if a pro-
fessor has a supervisory relationship over a student, and the professor capitalizes
upon that supervisory relationship to further the harassment of the student, the col-
lege is liable for the professor's conduct." Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 88.
164. See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 87.
165. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. In addition, the OCR unambigu-
ously asserts that an educational institution's liability for sexual harassment commit-
ted by its employees "is determined by application of agency principles." OCR
Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,039. The agency principles that the OCR
endorses derive entirely from Restatement § 219(2)(d). Id. at 12,039, 12,048 n.22-23.
There are conflicting views as to the OCR's authority. Courts have stated that they
will "accord the OCR's interpretations appreciable deference." Rowinsky v. Bryan
Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014 n.20 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Cohen v. Brown
Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993)). The OCR itself advocates that courts should
"defer to the expertise of an agency" that has the authority to interpret and enforce
Title IX. OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,036. In Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the effect of the EEOC Guide-
lines on the Court's interpretation of Title VII, stating that the Guidelines, "while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of expe-
rience and informed judgement to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance." 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
141-42 (1976) (citation omitted)); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating that "considerable weight"
should be given to the interpretation of the statute's administrative agency, but quali-
fying its support to situations in which "the meaning or reach of a statute ... de-
pendis] upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations" (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961) (em-
phasis added))).
In two recent cases, however, neither the Second nor the Fifth Circuits made refer-
ence to the OCR Guidance or to the OCR's request for comments, released in Fall of
1996, Office for Civil Rights Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,172 (1996), in formulating a standard of institu-
tional liability. See Kracunas, 119 F.3d 80; Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106
F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997). In Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District, the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the OCR Guidance and recognized that its own analysis
of Title IX institutional liability conflicted with the OCR Guidance's analysis, but
refused to apply the OCR Guidance retroactively. 106 F.3d 648, 658 (5th Cir. 1997)
(noting that the school received its federal funding before the issuance of the OCR
Guidance and explaining that to apply the Guidance retroactively-to funds already
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support this theory. The first argument is that the structure of the
university setting makes application of agency principles straightfor-
ward and logical. 6 6 The university empowers a professor to exercise
a great deal of authority over students.1 67 Professors are in positions
to further the university's goals of attracting and retaining students,
163
and they are the "agents" who carry out the educational institution's
goal of educating its students. 169 Within universities in particular, ed-
ucators are given wide latitude for their "academic freedom" as it per-
tains to their teaching duties, relations with students, and conduct
generally. 7 ° Thus, because a professor is "most certainly acting as [a
university]'s agent in his role of college professor .... [hjis blatant
abuse of that authority, if proven, is sufficient under agency principles
to impute liability to [the university].' 71
Another argument for the use of agency principles to support a
standard of institutional liability under Title IX is that students should
receive at least the same protection from sexual harassment as em-
received-would modify a preexisting agreement between the school and the govern-
ment). Therefore, the court declined to "comment on how these guidelines might
affect cases in which a school district accepts Title IX funds after the guidelines' pro-
mulgation date." Id The Seventh Circuit has gone even further in its dismissal of the
Guidance. In Smith v. Metropolitan School District Perr, Township, the court as-
serted that the OCR wrongly applied agency principles to Title IX, and, thus, it would
not defer to the Guidance. 128 F.3d 1014, 1033 (7th Cir. 1997) (arguing that the OCR
failed to consider factors, such as: Title IX's language, Title IX's enactment as a
Spending Clause statute, the differences between Title IX and Title VII, the financial
impact of the OCR's liability standard on schools, and outside comments on its posi-
tion). One commentator presumes, however, that "future courts will give weight to
the OCR's interpretation of the issue of institutional liability while still considering
other relevant interpretations of the law." Ellison, supra note 16, at 2148.
166. See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 87 (determining that there is no question that Pro-
fessor Palma was acting as an agent of Iona College).
167. Id at 87-88; see Roth, supra note 26, 512-13.
The use of agency principles to impute institutional liability for a professor's harass-
ing conduct presumes the finding that a professor is more like a supervisor to his
students than a co-worker, and, thus, has authority over the students. Indeed, there
seems to be little force in the argument that a professor is anything but a supervisor in
relation to his students. See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 86-87 (arguing that the professor
"was much more like a supervisor.., than a coworker"); Roth, supra note 26, at 502
(explaining that a professor's authority places him in a role akin to a supervisor under
Title VII).
168. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 87.
169. Roth, supra note 26, at 512-13. The district court in Pallett v. Palina, however,
argues that "[u]nder agency principles, Professor Palma obviously did not have actual
authority of the college to act as he allegedly did [by committing sexual harass-
ment].... [I]t is clear that Professor Palma was acting adversely to the institution
itself ...." 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). vacated sub nor. Kracunas v.
Iona College, 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
170. Roth, supra note 26, at 514; see Sue Rosenberg Zalk, Men in the Academy: A
Psychological Profile of Harassers, in Ivory Power, supra note 26, at 81, 84 (explaining
that one repercussion of this autonomy includes a professor's "exaggerated sense of
self-importance" which "contributes to an aura that shrouds the professor in the eyes
of many").
171. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 87-88.
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ployees would receive under Title VII. 172 As noted above, agency
principles are easily transferrable to the structure of the education en-
vironment. Thus, the same protection provided for employees under
Title VII should extend to students. 173  The Second Circuit, in
Kracunas, stated: "In the employment context, similar conduct by a
supervisor undoubtedly would visit liability on the employer. College
students should not receive less protection from conduct that is shown
to be harassment (as opposed to teaching) than do employees in the
workplace.'
174
The Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub-
lic Schools17 5 has also been used to support the application of agency
principles to determine institutional liability in Title IX cases of
teacher-student sexual harassment. Courts have used the decision in
two ways. First, courts note that Franklin cites Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson,176 a decision in which the Supreme Court directed lower
courts to employ agency principles to resolve Title VII liability is-
sues. 17 7 Therefore, courts, such as the Second Circuit, have held that
Franklin directs them, by analogy, to look to agency principles in Title
IX cases as well.178 In Murray v. New York University College of Den-
tistry, 7 9 for example, the Second Circuit argued that use of agency
principles is precisely what the Supreme Court desired in Franklin
when it cited to the Title VII case Meritor.180
Second, instead of linking Title IX with Title VII, several commen-
tators and at least one court have used the Franklin decision to distin-
172. See id. at 88 (supporting the application of agency principles to determine
Iona's liability); Stacy, supra note 20, at 1365-66.
173. In at least one circuit, however, an employer will be liable for supervisor-em-
ployee sexual harassment, but a school will not be liable for teacher-student harass-
ment. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 655-56 (5th Cir.
1997) (acknowledging that the Fifth Circuit has a constructive notice basis of liability
for Title VII claims-based on pervasiveness of the conduct-but refusing to extend it
to Title IX claims).
174. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 88.
175. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
176. 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
177. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
178. See, e.g., Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495,514 (6th Cir. 1996); Murray v.
New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995). But see infra
note 199 and accompanying text (discussing arguments against Franklin's support of
agency principles).
179. 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995).
180. Id. at 249 ("The Court's citation of Meritor. . . , a Title VII case, .... indicates
that, in a Title IX suit.., an educational institution may be held liable under stan-
dards similar to those applied in cases under Title VII." (citation omitted)). The OCR
Guidance also relies on the Franklin decision and its citation to Meritor as support for
the use of agency principles. OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,047 n.18
("The Supreme Court has ruled that agency principles apply in determining an em-
ployer's liability under Title VII .... These same principles should govern the liabil-
ity of educational institutions under Title IX ....").
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guish the statutes."' In Doe v. Petahna City School District, the
court noted that the Supreme Court "made no reference to Meritor's
(or any other Title VII case's) discussion of when an employer will be
held liable for... sexual harassment" when it considered the liability
of an educational institution. 182 The Petahna court continued by stat-
ing that the Supreme Court did not intend to imply that Title IX is
"co-extensive" with Title VII,'8 3 but, rather, that Franklin made Title
IX damages available against an institution for the intentionally dis-
criminatory acts of its agents based on the agency theory of respon-
deat superior.' 84
In Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District, ' the dis-
trict court relied on agency principles to develop an institutional liabil-
ity standard because of the Fifth Circuit's reliance on Title VI-which
requires a showing of institutional discriminatory intent to create lia-
bility-in analyzing Title IX.'s6 To hold the school itself liable for the
acts of its teacher, the court had to determine "[hlow... the wrongful,
discriminatory conduct of [the teacher could] be imputed to the school
district[.]"' 87 The court determined that application of agency princi-
ples would allow the court to impute the teacher's discriminatory in-
tent upon the school."m
ii. Arguments Against Agency Principles
There are several arguments, however, that courts have offered to
oppose the use of agency principles to develop a proper standard of
institutional liability. When the district court's Rosa H. decision
reached the Fifth Circuit, the court of appeals rejected the application
of agency principles under Title IX.'89 The court provided several ba-
181. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1575 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
("[I]t appears that the Supreme Court would impose liability on the school district
under agency principles for the intentional discrimination by its agent, a school
teacher .. "); Brief for Petitioners, available in 1998 WL 19745, at *34 n.22, Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to
106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.); Melsheimer et al., supra note 26, at 545-46: Stacy, supra note
20, at 1370.
182. Petalwna, 830 F. Supp. at 1575.
183. Id.
184. Idi; see also Brief for Petitioners at *34 n.22, Gebser (No. 96-1866) (interpret-
ing Franklin as suggesting that a school should be "directly accountable for inten-
tional discrimination by teachers").
185. 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
186. Id. at 142.
187. Id.
188. Id at 142-43. The court applied Restatement § 219(2)(b), and held that use of
this section required plaintiff to demonstrate, in addition to the intentional violations
of the teacher, a separate tort committed by the school. Id. at 143.
189. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 655 (5th Cir. 1997)
("We conclude that Title IX does not contemplate a theory of recovery based purely
on agency law."); see also Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1024 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("[N]o basis exists ... to hold [Title IX] grant recipients liable based on
agency principles.").
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ses for its holding. First, the Fifth Circuit relied on the argument that
Title IX is a Spending Clause statute. 190 The court acknowledged the
Supreme Court's directive in Franklin that a school has notice that it
will be held monetarily liable only for intentional violations of Title
IX.191 The Fifth Circuit argued, however, that the school did not have
notice that it would be held liable for the actions of its teachers based
on the application of agency principles."9 Making a subtle distinction,
the court stated that because the recipient of Title IX funds agrees
"not to discriminate on the basis of sex, ' 193 that does not mean that
the recipient "agreed to suffer liability whenever its employees dis-
criminate on the basis of sex."'194
Another argument against reliance on agency principles for Title IX
liability focuses on the textual differences of Titles VII and IX. Courts
have noted that Title VII makes "explicit reference to the agents of
employers."'195 Thus, because there was a specific legislative intent to
apply agency principles in Title VII cases, an employer's Title VII vio-
lations inherently include those of its supervisors. 96 Title IX, how-
ever, does not contain similar language broadening liability to
violations committed by a school's teachers. 97 Thus, as opposed to
Title VII, "Title IX does not instruct courts to impose liability based
on anything other than the acts of the recipients of federal funds."' 98
In addition, several courts have rejected the argument that Franklin
directed courts to apply agency principles. 99 The Fifth Circuit, with-
out detailed explanation, stated that, "[w]e are not convinced that
Franklin instructs us to find school districts vicariously liable when-
ever an employee intentionally harasses a student because of sex and
satisfies the agency rules of § 219 of the Restatement. 2 °0
Lastly, there is the argument that the use of agency principles to
determine institutional liability supports the imposition of strict liabil-
190. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654; see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Spending Clause statutes).
191. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654; see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Franklin decision).
192. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654 ("As a statute enacted under the Spending Clause,
Title IX should not generate liability unless the recipient of federal funds agreed to
assume the liability.").
193. Id.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Id. (emphasis added); see Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1023
(7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that Title VII's language goes further than Title IX's in
prohibiting sexual harassment).
196. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 568.
197. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1994) (providing a definition for "Educational institu-
tion"); Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654; Schneider, supra note 18, at 568.
198. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654.
199. Id.; Smith, 128 F.3d at 1023.
200. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654.
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ity on the schools.2° ' The Fifth Circuit viewed the district court's ap-
plication of agency principles in Rosa H. as an attempt to "evade Title
IX's intent requirement. 20 2 The court of appeals, therefore, made ex-
pressly clear that "agency law can [not] substitute imputed discrimina-
tory intent for actual discriminatory intent in Title IX cases."2 3 The
Fifth Circuit's contention that relying on agency principles, specifically
Restatement § 219(2)(d),2 ' would "create liability for school districts
in virtually every case in which a teacher harasses, seduces, or sexually
abuses a student"20 5 is based on the court's belief that a "teacher's
status as a teacher often enables the teacher to abuse the student."" 6
Moreover, "[a teacher]'s chances of initiating a sexual relationship...
[are] enhanced when the school district hire[s] him. 20 7 Thus, the
court did not dispute either the teacher's "apparent authority" over
the student, or the teacher being "aided in" accomplishing the harass-
ment. 0  The court concluded, however, that simply because this sec-
tion of the Restatement's factors were so easily satisfied, "is not a
sufficient reason to think that the school district discriminated on the
basis of sex."2 9  If the court had ruled otherwise, it would have ac-
cepted a standard tantamount to strict liability-a standard that the
Fifth Circuit had previously rejected.210
b. Strict Liability
Notwithstanding the arguments against the use of agency principles
to determine standards of institutional liability, courts and commenta-
tors continue to employ agency principles as a source of support for
standards that are analogous to strict liability. In addition, several
courts have employed strict liability without relying on agency princi-
201. Id. at 655; Smith, 128 F.3d at 1029-30; see infra Part II.D.1.b.ii. (discussing the
arguments opposing the imposition of strict liability against educational institutions
under Title IX).
202. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 652-53 (explaining that the required discriminatory intent
may not be imputed upon the school because the school must have actual intent to
discriminate for a court to award of damages); see supra note 186 and accompanying
text (discussing the district court's recognition of the actual discriminatory intent re-
quirement and its effort to evade it).
203. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 653.
204. The section reads in pertinent part:
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside
the scope of their employment, unless: the servant purported to act or to
speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent au-
thority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1958).
205. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 655 (emphasis added).
206. l
207. ld.; see Roth, supra note 26, at 515-16.
208. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1958).
209. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 655.
210. See infra note 237 and accompanying text (noting that the court's decision in
Canutillo rejected strict liability in Title IX cases).
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ples. Thus, the following section will examine the specific arguments
that support and oppose the strict liability standard.
i. The Arguments For Strict Liability
In Leija v. Canutillo Independent School District,21' the district
court imposed strict liability against an educational institution for a
Title IX teacher-student hostile environment sexual harassment
claim. 1l A central justification for this standard of institutional liabil-
ity is that "the risk of harm [from sexual harassment] is better placed
on a school district than on a young student. 2 13 Institutional liability
without knowledge imposes the risk of harassment on the school and
encourages schools' heightened vigilance. 14 The Leija court asserted
that the "student, vulnerable in every way, should not be the only ef-
fective line of defense or the policing authority. 2 15 In addition, to
further support the implementation of this standard, the court, as well
as commentators,216 stressed several other factors.
First, the district court focused on the difficulty students would have
in satisfying a liability standard with a knowledge requirement since
most sexual abuse "occurs or at least is attempted under cover of se-
crecy." 217 Thus, the court reasoned, a "knew or should have known"
requirement for the institution would be ineffective in cases of sexual
harassment.2 18 Further, a no-knowledge standard avoids the possibil-
ity of "administrators and others closing their eyes to the problem" of
211. 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (deciding a case in which a physical educa-
tion teacher was accused of sexually molesting a second grade student throughout the
1989-90 school year).
212. Id. at 954.
213. Id. at 955; see also Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1428 (E.D.
Mo. 1996) (quoting and supporting the Leija court's language); Brief for Petitioners,
available in 1998 WL 19745, at *35, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct.
595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.) (arguing that a no
knowledge standard-based on agency principles-is preferred over a constructive
notice "knew or should have known" standard, because, "[a]s between the school
district that put the teacher in the position of extracting sexual gratification through
abuse of his authority and the student who is thus abused, the school district should
bear the cost of this abuse"); Baker, supra note 20, at 305-06 ("[T]he expense should
not fall on students who are protected under Title IX, but on the schools who have the
duty to prevent harassment under Title IX.").
214. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 955; Schneider, supra note 18, at 567-68; see Baker, supra
note 20, at 305.
215. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 955.
216. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 18, at 569-70 (discussing the advantages of im-
posing institutional liability regardless of any institutional knowledge of the sexual
harassment); Baker, supra note 20, at 303 (proposing a strict liability standard against
educational institutions for teacher-student sexual harassment).
217. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 953; see also Schneider, supra note 18, at 568 (recogniz-
ing that "sexual harassment, by its very nature, often occurs in private, beyond the
purview of the employer or institution's administration").
218. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 953.
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sexual harassment. 19 The potential for "closed eyes" exists with a
"knew or should have known" standard because a school would not
want to "know" of the sexual harassment and would not likely be in a
position where it "should have known" of the harassment due to its
secretive nature.220
Another factor supporting liability without knowledge is that "un-
less the acts of the employees of the district are fully and strictly im-
puted to the district, Title IX becomes potentially inoperative."2 1
Teachers are essentially the only parties that can commit intentional
acts of sexual harassment in school.' Thus, because Title X is in-
tended to provide monetary awards to student-victims of sexual har-
assment,22  acts of teachers must be imputed to schools "in a
meaningful way, so that the intent of Congress... is not thwarted." 24
The Leija court, seeking to hold the defendant school liable under
Title IX, noted that application of Title VII agency principles would
not alleviate this statutory frustration problem.2' The court ex-
plained that "[n]o teacher who sexually abuses a student acts in the
scope of his authority. No school district anywhere... could ever be
found to condone, much less authorize, the sexual abuse of a child as a
part of its teachers' duties."' 6 Whether authorized or not, strict liabil-
ity allowed the court to impute the acts of the teacher to the school.'
219. Id. at 953; see also Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1429 (stating the same concern of
school officials "clos[ing] their eyes to the problem").
220. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 953; see also Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1429 (mentioning the
secrecy of sexual harassment as one factor that renders a knowledge requirement
unworkable).
221. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 953; see also supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text
(explaining why this problem is less of an issue in Title VII cases because the statute's
prohibitions against an employer specifically include its supervisors).
222. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 953 ("In teacher-student sexual abuse cases, intentional
discrimination can occur only through the intentional acts of a school district's em-
ployees." (emphasis added)).
223. Id (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60,75 (1992)
(White, J.), and Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 15 F.3d 443, 477 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting), in support of this interpretation of Title IX).
224. Id. (emphasis added); see also Brief of National Women's Law Center, Ameri-
can Association of University Women, California Women's Law Center, et al. As
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, available in 1998 WL 47598, at *17 (arguing
that Title IX surely includes the acts of teachers, the "agents" of the school), Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to
106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.); cf. supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress' Title IX intentions).
225. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 953.
226. Id. The court seems to be looking to §§ 219(1), (2)(d) of the Restatement of
Agency. See supra note 130 for the Restatement's full language. But see Kracunas v.
Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1997) (arguing that Professor Palma was
acting in the scope of his authority and abusing the duties delegated to him by the
college when he sexually harassed plaintiff).
227. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 953; see Baker, supra note 20, at 303 (proposing a liabil-
ity standard that disregards "whether the specific acts complained of were authorized
or even forbidden by the institution").
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The Eastern District of Missouri also discussed the issue of statu-
tory frustration in Bolon v. Rolla Public Schools.228 There, adopting a
strict liability standard, the court noted that unless a school board de-
cided to take a drastic, and an improbable, measure-such as forbid-
ding females from attending school-the school could avoid liability
because the board itself did not discriminate. 229 Furthermore, if a
teacher chose to forbid female students from attending his class, the
school could simply claim that it lacked knowledge of the Title IX
violations and, thus, would be free from liability.230 Consequently,
under this interpretation of the statute, Title IX would have minimal
effect in halting a fundamental form of sexual harassment in educa-
tional institutions-teacher-student sexual harassment.
Another factor supporting the strict liability standard is the belief
that educational institutions and their teachers owe a higher duty of
care to students than employers owe to employees.231 Unlike employ-
ees who receive direct economic compensation for their relationship
with an employer, a student's main benefits are derived from grades,
degrees, and other educational advancement. 32 These benefits are
primarily under the control of the teacher,233 are protected from dep-
rivation on the basis of sex by Title IX, and are dependent on the
physical and psychological environment within which the student
learns.234 Thus, automatically imputing a teacher's harassing behavior
to the school supports the institution's "important interest in ensuring
that a faculty member carries out his special fiduciary-type
responsibilities. 235
ii. The Arguments Against Strict Liability
There are several courts, however, that view the no-knowledge stan-
dard of institutional liability as misplaced and inappropriate for Title
228. 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (involving a Title IX claim against the
school district for the sexual relationship that a teacher had with plaintiff).
229. Id. at 1429.
230. Id.
231. Schneider, supra note 18, at 569 (examining the differences in applying strict
lability in a university environment as opposed to an employment setting and stating,
"[a]n [educational] institution has an important obligation to guard against the abuse
of the power relationship between faculty and students"); see Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at
1428 (elevating the responsibility of schools over employers as a justification for the
imputing of teachers' actions onto the school); see also Baker, supra note 20, at 305
(noting that a school's superior duty of care is particularly true when the students are
minors).
232. Baker, supra note 20, at 306.
233. See Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 1997) (arguing that the
professor had great influence and control over the student-victim's academic and ca-
reer success because of his position).
234. Schneider, supra note 18, at 551-53 (arguing that "[a] sexually abusive environ-
ment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed student from developing her full intellec-
tual potential and receiving the most from the academic program").
235. Id. at 569.
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IX claims of sexual harassment. 6 Subsequent to an interlocutory ap-
peal filed by the Canutillo Independent School District, the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected the district court's application of the strict liability
standard against the school district for teacher-student hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment. 37 One reason for the renunciation of a
no knowledge standard is the interpretation of Title IX as a Spending
Clause statute.238 Pointing to the similarities between Title IX and
Title VI, particularly their similarity as Spending Clause statutes, one
court stated that "Congress must be clear and 'unambiguous[ I' about
any conditions or obligations it is imposing on the recipient of such
funds." 9 Thus, because there is no "whisper of strict liability" within
Title IX, and because nothing in the statute "places a school district on
notice that it will be strictly liable for its teachers' criminal acts,"
courts have held that they will not apply a strict liability standard.24
Courts have also highlighted the lack of sound policy for applying a
strict liability standard.2 4' The Fifth and Seventh Circuits analogized
the school to a manufacturer, and students to products. 2 42 They noted
that the costs of imputing strict liability to a manufacturer is accepted
because a manufacturer is able to spread the enhanced regulations
costs to consumers by increasing the price of its products. 24 3 Because
a school's products are its students, however, a school would only be
able to defray such added costs by increasing the "price" paid through
federal, state and community funds, a measure which the court explic-
itly rejects.2' Thus, the potential for "million-dollar verdicts" against
the school and the risk of financial ruin are too high under a strict
liability regime.245
236. See, eg., Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the imposition of strict liability under Title IX is inappropriate); Canu-
tillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393,398 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding school district
did not have the requisite actual or constructive notice).
237. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398.
238. Id; see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing Spending Clause
statutes).
239. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (alteration in original)). But see supra notes 78-82 and accompa-
nying text (describing the Supreme Court's response to this issue).
240. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398-99; see Smith, 128 F.3d at 1030-31. The Fifth Circuit
more readily accepts employer liability for an employee's violations in Title VII cases.
however, because of the statute's explicit inclusion of "agents of employers." Rosa H.
v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997).
241. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1030-31; Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 399.
242. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1030-31; Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 399.
243. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1030-31; Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 399.
244. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 399 ("As horrible a crime as child abuse is, we do not
live in a risk-free society; it contorts 'public policy' to suggest that communities should
be held financially responsible in this manner (strict liability) for such criminal acts of
teachers.").
245. Id. at 399-400; see Smith, 128 F.3d at 1032 (discussing the financial repercus-
sions of strict liability on educational institutions).
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In addition, unlike manufacturers, there is a limit to the regulating
and screening that a school can do to prevent teacher-student sexual
harassment.246 These limits decrease the school's ability to control
both its teachers and its students.247 This lack of control argument
may be even stronger within the university context due to the "strong
tradition of academic freedom [which] dictates a degree of faculty in-
dependence" and simply because "institutional control over faculty
may be impossible or undesirable. 248
Lastly, the Canutillo court noted the potential conflicts that would
arise if a school were both educator and insurer.249 In such a situa-
tion, "it is most arguable that [the school's] role as educator-needed
now more than ever-will suffer, and suffer most greatly. '250 Despite
this grave warning, the court did not elaborate on its concerns nor on
the actual repercussions of the school's dual role.251
Imputing liability upon a school for sexual harassment of which it
has no knowledge interprets Title IX in its broadest form and places a
significant degree of accountability upon educational institutions for
any violations that occur.252 Liability without knowledge provides
plaintiffs with an improved potential for damages recovery from the
school." 3 In turn, this creates a significant hurdle for educational in-
stitutions in their defense of Title IX violations.25 4 As the Seventh
246. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 399 (arguing that humans are unpredictable and cannot
be monitored for 'defects' the way that products can, and also that there are Constitu-
tional limits to a school's ability to conduct exhaustive background checks).
247. Id.
248. Schneider, supra note 18, at 569. But see Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d
80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that "academic freedom" is placed in no jeopardy
because liability is imputed to a university for the actions of its professors).
249. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 400.
250. Id.
251. Id. The court may have worried that a school would wrongly shift its resources
from educating its students to acquiring some form of liability insurance. The court
may also have had concerns that a school would take such extreme measures to avoid
liability that the basic quality and nature of the education would suffer. See Roth,
supra note 26, at 520 (noting the concern that the prospect of Title IX liability may
cause schools to "overreact and take extreme measures without consideration for due
process and the careers of faculty and students").
252. See Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1428 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (sup-
porting the imposition of liability without knowledge by citing the Supreme Court's
directive to provide Title IX "a sweep as broad as its language" (quoting North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982))).
253. See Baker, supra note 20, at 307 (endorsing institutional liability without
knowledge and stating that "Title IX was intended to require institutions to provide
an educational environment free of sex discrimination, including sex-based harass-
ment. When they fail to live up to this duty, the cost of this failure should fall on
them, not on the victim of sex-based harassment.").
254. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 568 (discussing the difficulties educational in-
stitutions would confront from a liability standard that does not require knowledge,
including: that genuine efforts to eradicate the problem would not absolve schools
from liability; and that the covertness of sexual harassment makes it difficult to pre-
vent its occurrence despite "careful vigilance by the [school]").
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Circuit noted, liability without knowledge "would create liability for
the [s]chool... even if [it] acted without notice of the alleged harass-
ment; even if [it] had no reason to know of the harassment; and even
if [it] acted entirely reasonably."-"
2. Institutional Knowledge-Based on a Negligence Theory-
Necessary for Liability
The Eighth Circuit, in Kinman v. Omaha Public School District,"
applied a negligence theory to Title IX and held that an educational
institution should be liable only if it has "engaged in some degree of
culpable behavior."" 7 The court explained that institutional liability
should be based on a "knew or should have known" standard."
Elaborating the Eighth Circuit's standard, one commentator has de-
fined the negligence standard of institutional liability as requiring "the
plaintiff [to] establish that the school knew or should have known of
the actions that created the hostile environment and failed to take
appropriate action to remedy the situation."2- 9
Many courts that apply a negligence or "knew or should have
known" standard for Title IX cases point to Title VII case law for their
authority."6 The precedent for Title IX's reliance on Title VII's appli-
cation of negligence derives, as it does with Title IX's reliance on Title
VII's agency principles, 61 from Franklin, in which the Supreme Court
cited to Meritor-a Title VII case.262
255. Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
strict liability and agency principles as bases for institutional liability in a Title IX
case).
256. 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
257. Id. at 469.
258. d.; see also Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (adopting a Title VII standard, which is interpreted as a "knew or should
have known" standard). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit asserts that -the
constructive-notice standard is essentially grounded in negligence." Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 656 (5th Cir. 1997). For purposes of this
discussion, negligence is interchangeable with a knowledge requirement. Smith, 128
F.3d at 1022 (stating that "'the 'knew or should have known' standard is really just a
negligence theory").
259. Ellison, supra note 16, at 2120; see Roth, supra note 26, at 517.
260. See Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
actual and constructive notice apply to cases arising under Title IX, as they do under
Title VII); Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469 (extending Title VII's "knew or should have
known" standard of liability to Title IX cases of teacher-student sexual harassment);
Petalwna, 949 F. Supp. at 1426 (stating that the Title VII standard of liability, -which
imposes liability where the entity knows or should have known of the hostile environ-
ment .... is the appropriate standard" to apply to Title IX cases).
261. See supra notes 178, 180 and accompanying text (noting the reliance on Frank-
lin's citation of Meritor to justify use of agency principles).
262. See supra note 77 and accompanying quote for the Court's citation.
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The negligence standard also has some basis in agency principles, 63
particularly Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(b), which
states that a "master" will be liable for the torts of a servant if "the
master was negligent or reckless."' The district court in Rosa H.
employed this section of the Restatement and proposed that the sec-
tion required two torts to find institutional liability: "[t]he intentional
tort of the school employee and the negligence tort on the part of the
school district. '265 The court further explained that a plaintiff must
show that the school had "notice, either actual or constructive, of the
sexual harassment, '266 and that the school "failed to take prompt, ef-
fective, remedial measures. 267
As stated earlier, the Fifth Circuit argued that requiring a school to
have knowledge of the teacher-student sexual harassment as a condi-
tion to a recovery of damages "will result in much quicker and greater
protection. ' 268 In contrast to a liability standard with a knowledge
requirement, a no-knowledge standard fosters a school's inability to
act promptly.269 Because sexual harassment often occurs in secret, it
is difficult for a school to detect, stop, and remove the harassing
teacher without knowledge provided by the student-victim.270 One
commentator further notes that liability without knowledge may influ-
ence a university not to "vigorously prosecut[e] the grievance inter-
nally, [because it] would establish [a] case that could be used against it
in subsequent litigation initiated by the student. 271
A knowledge requirement may also provide the school with an op-
portunity to remedy the sexual harassment and escape liability. 72
The school is given time in which it can "act on behalf of the student,
that is, terminate the discriminatory conduct, before being subject to
liability. ' 273 Institutional liability based on negligence also permits no
263. See supra Part II.D.L.a. for a discussion of whether relying on agency princi-
ples to support a standard of institutional liability is proper.
264. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(b) (1958); see Roth, supra note 26,
at 490.
265. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Tex.
1995), rev'd, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 1996). The
Fifth Circuit rejects the application of a constructive knowledge standard to impose
institutional liability. See infra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
269. See Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 399.
270. See id.
271. Schneider, supra note 18, at 570.
272. Id.; see also Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (stating that "even if a hostile environment exists, and the entity has actual
or constructive notice of it, the entity is not liable if it takes prompt, appropriate
remedial action"). The OCR also emphasizes that a school may avoid Title IX liabil-
ity in these circumstances "if it takes immediate and appropriate action upon notice of
the harassment." OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,039.
273. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Tex.
1995), rev'd, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
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liability in a situation where there is no opportunity for the school to
remedy the hostile environment sexual harassment because of its con-
cealed nature. 74
Moreover, a negligence standard is better suited to address sexual
harassment in educational institutions because the school "is in the
best position to be on the lookout" for Title IX violations.275 Such a
position demands that a school oversee its teachers and students, or,
in the alternative, be subject to liability.2 7 The Rosa H. district court
believed that a "knew or should have known" standard "prevents a
situation where the [school] ... turns a blind eye toward" sexual har-
assment.277 The protection provided by this standard will, arguably,
aid the harassed student, as well as protect other students from being
harassed in the future.278 One commentator also notes that students
may be more likely to report incidents of sexual harassment to the
school if knowledge were a prerequisite to the institution's liability.2 79
As noted by the Eighth Circuit, the negligence standard imputes
liability upon the school if it "knew or should have known" of the
sexual harassment.20 The remainder of this section will separately
consider the "knew" standard, or the actual knowledge of the school,
and the "should have known" standard, or the constructive knowledge
of the school.
a. Actual Knowledge
A principal issue that must be resolved with the "actual knowledge"
standard, is to determine "whose knowledge is sufficient to hold the
school district liable."" 1 If courts follow Title VII on this issue, =
then the person -with the actual knowledge must be in a "manage-
274. IL But see Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(arguing against a negligence standard specifically because the harassment occurs
secretly).
275. Rosa H., 887 F. Supp. at 143.
276. See id
277. Id But see Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1429 (arguing against a -knew or should
have known" standard because it "could tempt school officials to close their eyes to
the problem, with hopes that shielding themselves from knowledge will also shield
them from liability").
278. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that if knowledge is a condition to recovery of damages, then student-
plaintiffs will likely report their harassment more quickly, thereby protecting them-
selves as well as potential future victims).
279. Schneider, supra note 18, at 570 (noting also that the lack of a knowledge
requirement would thwart the educational institution's ability to resolve sexual har-
assment complaints internally).
280. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996).
281. Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1429; see Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106
F.3d 648, 659 (5th Cir. 1997).
282. See, e.g., Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 401 (applying Ttle VII to resolve this issue).
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ment-level" position.283 This person must have "some authority over
employees, including, perhaps, the power to hire, fire, or disci-
pline." 4 Transferring the standard to Title IX, "the school district
does not have actual knowledge of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment until someone with authority to take remedial action is noti-
fied.... [I]t may well be that that someone must be a member of the
school board."'285 Under such a requirement, therefore, notifying a
professor does not meet that standard.286
Conversely, one commentator argues that an educational institution
is deemed to have actual notice, for liability purposes, if a student tells
a teacher of the sexual harassment.287 The OCR agrees, 288 stating that
a school receives actual notice of sexual harassment "as long as an
agent or responsible employee of the school received notice. '289 The
OCR avoids providing an exhaustive list of who is an "agent or re-
sponsible employee."2 90 Instead, the Guidance provides examples of
283. Id. at 401; see also Roth, supra note 26, at 490-91 (noting that, under Title VII,
"[a]ctual knowledge has been found where there is firsthand knowledge of the harass-
ment, either because the harasser himself is an officer of the employer's company, or
because a high level employee has personally witnessed the harassment" (citations
omitted)).
284. Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 401.
285. Id. at 402 (emphasis added); see also Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660 (elaborating
upon its decision in Canutillo by stating that a school district will be liable only if the
school official with the actual knowledge had a specific duty to supervise the harassing
employee, had the power to take actions that would end such abuse, and failed to do
so).
286. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660; Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 402.
287. Roth, supra note 26, at 518. This standard of notice, however, is argued pri-
marily with elementary and secondary schools in mind. See id. (arguing that this no-
tice standard makes "particular sense in elementary and secondary schools" because
of the preexisting legal duty that school officials have to report incidents of sexual
abuse).
288. In addition to liability founded on agency principles, see supra note 165, the
OCR also imputes institutional liability under Title IX "if the school 'has notice' of a
sexually hostile environment and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action." OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,042. The OCR explains that
"notice" can be actual or constructive. Id. This standard is primarily applicable to
sexual harassment perpetrated by a non-school employee, such as another student. Id.
at 12,039 (discussing the "knew or should have known" standard in its section, "Lia-
bility of a School for Peer or Third Party Harassment"). Notice, however, is only
required for this 'negligence' standard. There is no notice requirement for harass-
ment--either quid pro quo or hostile environment-committed by a school employee
that satisfies the criteria of § 219(2)(d) of the Restatement. Id. at 12,042 n.63. For the
exact Restatement language see supra note 130.
Although this Note does not address the issue of peer harassment, it analyzes the
OCR's application of the negligence standard to compare it to the negligence stan-
dards proposed by courts and commentators.
289. OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,042.
290. Id. The OCR states that "[a]n exhaustive list of employees would be inappro-
priate, however, because whether an employee is an agent or responsible school em-
ployee, or whether it would be reasonable for a student to believe the employee is an
agent or responsible employee, even if the employee is not, will vary." Id. at 12,037.
It is not clear from the language of the Guidance whether an ultimate list of school
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the appropriate parties, including students, parents, or teachers con-
tacting principals, teachers, campus security, bus drivers, or student
affairs officers.2 91 The OCR disagrees with the contention that a
school has notice only through managerial or designated
employees.292
b. Constructive Knowledge: The "Should Have Known" Standard
As an alternative to "actual knowledge," a plaintiff may argue that
the pervasiveness or severity of the hostile environment sexual harass-
ment justifies an inference that a school had "constructive knowledge"
of the harassment. 93 In considering this constructive notice standard,
some courts have reasoned that it is a means of ensuring that schools
will not simply be held to a strict liability standard or found liable
based solely on the teacher's use of his position of authority to further
the harassment.2 94 Employing a constructive notice standard may also
avoid a head-in-the-sand problem by encouraging schools to monitor,
seek out, and eliminate sexually harassing behavior that it should have
known about.2 95
In cases of constructive notice, the OCR states that a school
"should have known" of the sexual harassment if a "reasonably dili-
gent inquiry" would have revealed it.296 An example of this would be
if the pervasiveness of the harassment was such that it should have
prompted the school to act.297 The OCR argues that the constructive
notice standard is appropriate because of the school's "obligation to
respond," and because the standard is simply punishing schools that
"ignore[ ] or fail[ ] to recognize overt or obvious problems of sexual
harassment. 298
The Fifth Circuit rejected the use of a constructive notice standard
in determining institutional liability.299 The court argued that the
"should have known" standard "treats the ... [school] as if it had
employees, established and distributed by the educational institution, would allow the
exclusion of other employees' knowledge under the OCR's standard.
291. Id at 12,042. The Guidance, in a footnote, states that the ultimate determina-
tion of whether a school has actual notice through an agent or responsible employee
"depend[s] on factors such as the authority actually given to the employee and the age
of the student." Id. at 12,042 n.65.
292. Id. at 12,037.
293. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 401 (5th Cir. 1996); Doe
v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Roth, supra
note 26, at 518.
294. See Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 655-56 (5th Cir.
1997) (rejecting a constructive notice standard, although the court acknowledges that
this standard would not be liability based on agency principles); Petaluma, 949 F.
Supp. at 1426 (rebutting arguments that this is a strict liability standard).
295. See Petaluma, 949 F. Supp. at 1426; Roth, supra note 26, at 518.
296. OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,042 (citations omitted).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 12,037.
299. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 656.
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actual notice of the harassment, '300 and that this would "burden fed-
erally funded educational institutions with open-ended negligence lia-
bility."301 While conceding that a constructive notice standard is more
protective of a school than agency principles, the court continued to
guard against any threat to the school's financial security.302 More-
over, to counter the argument that Franklin endorsed the use of a
Title VII-adopted constructive notice standard,30 3 the Fifth Circuit in-
sisted that a single citation in Franklin-for the sole purpose of deem-
ing sexual harassment actionable under Title IX-"does not by itself
justil the importation of other aspects of Title VII law into the Title
IX context. 304
As this analysis indicates, there is little consensus over the appropri-
ate standard of institutional liability for Title IX violations. The stan-
dards of liability that courts have applied vary in strictness, knowledge
and evidentiary requirements, and the manner in which they interpret
similar bases of support, whether Supreme Court decisions or the lan-
guage of Title IX itself. Thus, it is evident that courts, as well as the
parties affected by Title IX, require guidance in formulating a struc-
tured and uniform standard of institutional liability.
III. TOWARD A MODEL STANDARD OF LIABILITY
A university jeopardizes and impairs a student's growth and educa-
tional experience when professors -sexually harass students. 305 For
Title IX to have any significant effect in eradicating sexual
harassment in universities, the prohibitions of the statute must
include the discriminatory acts committed by a school's professors,30 6
300. Id.
301. Id. (emphasis added).
302. Id.; see supra note 245 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
304. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 656.
305. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 534-35.
306. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, avail-
able in 1998 WL 24199, at *17, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595
(1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.) (stating that teachers
are the persons "through whom a school district generally acts in day-to-day relations
with its students, not the school principal or school board members"). Given profes-
sors' tremendous autonomy, they should face greater Title IX liability than elemen-
tary school teachers. Thus, to ensure that the professor and the university share in the
liability, courts should interpret Title IX as making clear that universities and the
individual professors fall within the definition' of the "educational institutions" pro-
hibited from sexual discrimination. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1994), with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (defining "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person." (emphasis added)). In the
alternative, Congress could amend Title IX to specifically provide for this. When a
student-victim seeks recovery for sexual harassment, she should be able to apply the
Title IX protections against the individual violator of the statute, as well as against the
institutional violator. This issue is distinct to universities. Teachers in grade schools,
like supervisors in the workplace, do not have the same level of autonomy granted to
them. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text; see also Schneider, supra note 18,
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and a model standard of liability should have this goal in
mind.307
At least one commentator has recognized the need to have Title IX
extend to professor misconduct. In February, 1987, Ronna Greff
Schneider published Sexual Harassment and Higher Education.-°s In
the article, she advanced three situations in which schools should be
liable for teacher-student sexual harassment: (1) if the school did not
establish an anti-discrimination policy and grievance procedure; (2) if
the school has actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and
did not respond appropriately; and (3) as an exception to requiring
knowledge, if the sexual harassment was quid pro quo harassment.'
At the time Schneider wrote her article, there had been only two re-
ported federal claims of Title IX sexual harassment. 10
Although Professor Schneider's article is useful as a starting point,
the law of Title IX sexual harassment has evolved in the subsequent
eleven years. There have been several significant legal developments
concerning Title IX that have changed the landscape of sexual harass-
ment law. The most notable development is the 1992 Supreme Court
decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.31 1 The
Court's decision, making monetary damages available for Title IX
claims, required the lower courts to develop their own Title IX institu-
tional liability standards and to address the evidentiary issues in ap-
plying those standards. In addition, as a result of the surge in sexual
harassment litigation since Franklin, courts must now be sensitive to
the financial impact that their decisions will have on schools and uni-
versities. In 1987, the possibility of $1.4 million jury verdicts for Title
IX sexual harassment claims would have been remote. 12 Moreover,
Franklin's citation to Title VII case law has made the development of
at 569 ("The strong tradition of academic freedom dictates a degree of faculty inde-
pendence in the academic setting which is uncommon, if not nonexistent, in the em-
ployment setting."). This autonomy does not excuse the university from liability, but
it should place greater responsibility for Title IX violations on an individual professor
than on an elementary school teacher or employee supervisor.
307. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
Given the growth in hostile environment sexual harassment on college campuses,
see supra note 28 and accompanying text, and the paralleled increase in student-vic-
tims seeking redress under Title IX, see supra note 21 and accompanying text, it is
necessary to have this liability standard defined within the text of the statute. The
liability standard itself, therefore, should be an express aspect of the Title IX funding
agreement between universities and Congress. Such a measure would help overcome
the Fifth Circuit's Spending Clause arguments. See supra notes 190, 238-40 and ac-
companying text.
308. Schneider, supra note 18.
309. 1& at 572.
310. Id. at 527 n.8 (citing Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980), and
Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. Of Med., 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986)).
311. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
312. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1996) (not-
ing the jury's verdict for $1.4 million in compensatory damages and reversing on other
grounds).
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a uniform standard of institutional liability more difficult, as courts
have varied greatly in the weight they give this citation. Lastly, Pro-
fessor Schneider's standard of liability improperly conflates actual and
constructive knowledge of sexual harassment into one basis of liability
by not appropriately differentiating between the two. Such a standard
would impute liability in nearly all occurrences of sexual harass-
ment.3 13 All of these factors indicate that a reappraisal of Title IX's
liability objectives, as well as any proposed standard itself, is essential.
Before discussing this Note's recommended standard of institu-
tional liability for Title IX claims of professor-student hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment, it is necessary to outline the goals of this
standard and why a uniform standard is essential. Elucidating the
goals of institutional liability guides the choice of such a standard. As
such, this part will first discuss the importance and purposes of this
Note's Title IX liability standard and then will propose a model
standard.
Any standard of liability must be able to adjust to the unique cir-
cumstances of a case.314 It is essential, however, that courts consist-
ently apply one standard of institutional liability for the benefit of and
fairness to student-victims, universities, and professors. 315 By height-
ening a university's internal efforts to address professor-student sexual
harassment, the consistent application of a liability standard can pro-
vide positive results that far outweigh any possible negative effects of
institutional liability.
The primary objective of establishing a standard of institutional lia-
bility is to compel universities and professors to prevent professor-
student sexual harassment on campus. For both the victims of sexual
harassment and other individuals touched by its occurrence, the ef-
fects of sexual harassment may extend far beyond what may be reme-
died by a financial award.316 This Note argues, therefore, that the
313. See infra note 327 and accompanying text.
314. Cf Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468-69 (8th Cir. 1996) (ex-
plaining that "the divergence of views" on institutional liability "stems in part from
the factual disparity in the cases").
315. In addition, the financial solvency of universities and how financial liability
would affect the educational environment must be considered. See Pallett v. Palma,
914 F. Supp. 1018, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (emphasizing that the money that would
potentially go to student-victims of sexual harassment "could be used better for the
instruction of other students"), vacated sub nom. Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d
80 (2d Cir. 1997); supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
that "million dollar verdicts" could have on educational institutions). Congress
should, therefore, include Title IX in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a's coverage. Section 1981a is a
statutorily created cap on damages that applies to claims arising under Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994); see supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. There is
also an argument that universities should only be liable for granting equitable relief to
the plaintiff, such as: transcript adjustments, course changes, or tuition reimburse-
ment. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 573.
316. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing the diverse effects of
sexual harassment).
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force of an effective standard of institutional liability lies in its ability
to affect the behavior of the university and professors before sexual
harassment occurs. Thus, the goal of an institutional liability standard
should be the eradication of sexual harassment on campus, and not
compensation for the individual student-victim. 17 In addition, this
Note's model standard of liability addresses the issues that the Frank-
lin decision raised,318 and it revises Schneider's bases of institutional
liability, specifically her "actual or constructive notice standard," to
conform to the current landscape of Title IX law.
A. University Liability through an Adapted Negligence Theory, and
Its Application
The model liability standard offered in this Note is similar, although
wvith some modifications, to the negligence standard that several
courts have applied to Title IX cases.3" 9 The institutional liability de-
termination should focus on whether the university itself has "engaged
in some degree of culpable behavior." 2 ' The university should, there-
fore, be liable for Title IX violations of professor-student hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment in three situations:
(1) if the university had constructive knowledge of egregious or
rampant harassment and did not act to remedy the situation; 32
1
(2) if the university had actual knowledge of severe or pervasive
harassment and, again, did not act to remedy the situation2 -' or
317. The OCR has stated, "the best way for a school to deal with sexual harassment
is to prevent it from occurring." U.S. Department of Education. Office for Civil
Rights, Sexual Harassment It's Not Academic (visited May 22, 1997) <http'JI
www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/ocrshpam.html> [hereinafter It's Not Academicl; see also
Brief of the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, available in 1998 WL 19697, at *3, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S.
Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.) ("[Tihe most
effective means for reaching Title IX's goal are pro-active school district efforts to
promote equal treatment of all students and to prevent discrimination." (emphasis
added)).
318. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing several issues created and
left unresolved by the Franklin decision).
319. See supra Part ILD.2.
320. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996).
321. See Roth, supra note 26, at 518 (explaining that a court can make an "infer-
ence of constructive knowledge" depending on the severity of the sexual harassment);
see also Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(applying a liability standard which holds a school liable if it "should have known" of
the sexual harassment).
322. See Kinmnan, 94 F.3d at 469 (applying a liability standard that holds a school
liable if it "knew" of the harassment); Petaluna, 949 F. Supp. at 1426 (explaining that
a plaintiff must prove that the harassment was "severe or pervasive" to satisfy the
actual knowledge standard); OCR Guidance, supra note 23, at Fed. Reg. 12,041-
12,042 (stating that a school violates Title IX if it "actually 'knew"' of "severe or
pervasive" harassment and failed to take appropriate action).
2602 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
(3) if the university did not have effective and accessible sexual har-
assment procedures established at the time of the sexual
harassment.32 3
Institutional liability against a university should exist if the univer-
sity has constructive knowledge of egregious or rampant professor-
student sexual harassment-if the university "should have known"
about the harassment. For a university to have constructive knowl-
edge of a Title IX violation, the sexual harassment must be egregious
or rampant, a more exacting harassment standard than the "severe or
pervasive" level.324 In other words, because Title IX hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims require a minimum finding of "severe
or pervasive" conduct,32 5 constructive knowledge is only appropriate
in a subset of all such cases. 326 If all "severe or pervasive" hostile
323. See Brief of National Women's Law Center, American Association of Univer-
sity Women, California Women's Law Center, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, available in 1998 WL 47598, at *23, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert to 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.)
(stating that schools should be "liable under Title IX for their own wrongful actions");
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, available in 1998
WL 24199, at *17, Gebser (No. 96-1866) (discussing the negative repercussions of
neither having nor disseminating sexual harassment policies throughout the school
community).
324. See supra note 112 (explaining that a showing of "severe or pervasive" harass-
ment is one of the elements of an actionable Title IX hostile environment sexual har-
assment claim). For Title VII and Title IX cases, there is no set list of factors that
courts employ to measure a harasser's conduct. Most courts and commentators rely
on two separate analyses: (1) an objective analysis of whether a "reasonable woman"
would perceive the conduct as "severe or pervasive"; see Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d
625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997); OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,041; and (2) a
subjective analysis of whether the victim perceived the conduct as "severe or perva-
sive." See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); OCR Guidance, supra
note 23, at 12,041. The OCR outlines several factors that the analyses should con-
sider, including: "[tjhe degree to which the conduct affected one or more students'
education;" any "tangible or obvious injuries"-although harassment can occur with-
out tangible injury; the nature and frequency of the conduct; the number of individu-
als involved; and, the location of the conduct. OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed.
Reg. at 12,041-12,042 (emphasis removed). Courts can apply these factors to find
egregious or rampant harassment, although the degree to which the factors existed
must be greater than for the "severe or pervasive" standard. As explained above,
"egregious or rampant" sexual harassment is an extreme level of "severe or perva-
sive" harassment. See infra notes 358-59 for scenarios in which a court may find that
conduct is "severe or pervasive" but not "egregious or rampant" enough to infer con-
structive knowledge.
325. Torres, 116 F.3d at 630-31 (ruling that its analysis of Title VII is transferable to
Title IX).
326. This is akin to the assessment that courts must make to satisfy the "pervasive
or severe" requirement. The Second Circuit explained that hostile environment sex-
ual harassment exists if the conduct is "severe or pervasive," but conduct "that is
'merely offensive' and 'not severe or pervasive enough to create a[ ] . . . hostile or
abusive work environment' does not trigger Title IX. Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at
21). Similarly, under the model standard, if a court finds that conduct is "severe or
pervasive" but does not reach the level of "egregious or rampant" then liability based
on a university's constructive knowledge is not available under Title IX.
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environment sexual harassment claims could substantiate a claim of
constructive knowledge, a university would be liable in every case of
sexual harassment.32 7 Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
sexual harassment was "egregious or rampant," however, targets the
most serious cases of harassment and ensures that a constructive
knowledge standard will not simply be "open ended negligence" akin
to a strict liability standard.3  In her article, Professor Schneider
failed to make this distinction between actual knowledge and con-
structive knowledge.329 The implication of the oversight is potentially
open-ended liability.330
If a student-plaintiff demonstrates that the university had construc-
tive knowledge of particularly egregious harassment and did nothing
to remedy the situation, then that is negligent behavior and should
render the university liable based on its failure to provide an environ-
ment free from such sexual harassment.331 Moreover, this will help
prevent sexual harassment before it occurs by encouraging universi-
ties to implement monitoring procedures that will seek out and elimi-
327. For example, under the OCR Guidance, in order to hold a school liable for
actual or constructive knowledge of a hostile environment Title IX claim, a plaintiff
must demonstrate "severe or pervasive" harassment. OCR Guidance, supra note 23,
Fed. Reg. at 12,041-12,042. For constructive knowledge, the OCR does not raise the
degree of the harassment that plaintiff must demonstrate and, thus, a school will
seemingly be liable, based on its constructive knowledge, in ever- actionable claim of
sexual harassment whether it has received actual notice or not. Id. at 12,042; see also
Roth, supra note 26, at 492 ("In general, where a plaintiff has already established that
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to render it actionable as hostile
environment harassment, it seems likely that there will also be a sufficient basis for
constructive notice to the employer."). Moreover, quid pro quo sexual harassment is,
by definition, severe, such that liability automatically attaches to it. See supra notes
119-20 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
329. Schneider, supra note 18, at 572.
330. See supra note 312; see also Kaija Clark, Note, School Liability and Compensa-
tion for Title IX Sexual Harassment Violations by Teachers and Peers, 66 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 353, 377-78 (1998) (noting the need for the prevention of "unbound reme-
dies" awarded to Title IX plaintiffs).
331. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing Title IX recipients' "af-
firmative duty" to protect students from sexual harassment). Title IX states: "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded .... be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program ... receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
For both constructive and actual knowledge liability, the satisfaction of the univer-
sity's requirement to remedy the situation is a factual question. See Kracunas v. Iona
College, 119 F.3d 80, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1997). The university should, at a minimum, take
the following steps in a manner that is prompt, thorough and impartial: investigate
the accuracy of the complaints; confront the accused; and enforce some degree of
discipline upon the accused if the university confirms the accuracy of the complaint-
this may take the form of warnings, mandatory counseling, or dismissal. See OCR
Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,042-12,043.
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nate sexually harassing behavior as this will often relieve them of
liability.332
For hostile environment sexual harassment claims in which the al-
leged conduct is not egregious or rampant, institutional liability
against a university should exist where the university has actual
knowledge of severe or pervasive sexual harassment. The university
should establish a specified list of university personnel whose knowl-
edge of the sexual harassment of a student would render a university
as having "actual knowledge." '333 Unlike elementary and secondary
school students, college students can more readily understand and
utilize the "channels of authority" that exist within a university to ad-
dress claims of sexual harassment. 34 In addition, because the univer-
sity must disseminate this information throughout the campus,3 35 this
attention will heighten the overall awareness to and discussion of the
problem of sexual harassment.336
The list of persons whose "actual knowledge" can be imputed to the
university should include: professors, deans, health personnel, student
and academic affairs officers, and university officials.337 Professors
are particularly important to include because students often develop
ties with certain professors with whom they feel comfortable in shar-
332. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that knowledge as a prerequisite to damages increases the likelihood of
students reporting incidents of harassment, thus more quickly protecting themselves
and potential future victims); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp.
140, 143 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (arguing that a knowledge requirement prevents schools
from "turn[ing] a blind eye" towards the problem of sexual harassment), rev'd, 106
F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997); cf Melsheimer et al., supra note 26, at 553 (noting that
detailed sexual harassment policies, which include effective monitoring, are strong
tools in "recogniz[ing] and eradicat[ing] this continuing problem").
333. Title IX does require educational institutions to "designate at least one em-
ployee to coordinate [the school's] efforts to comply with and carry out its responsibil-
ities." 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (1994).
334. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, avail-
able in 1998 WL 24199, at *17, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595
(1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir.). It appears that there is
resistance in establishing a specific list of elementary or secondary school personnel
because of the concern that those schools may be able to avoid liability by claiming
that the 'right' person did not have knowledge. Cf supra note 290 (noting the OCR's
reluctance in providing a specified list).
335. If a university did not inform its students of the designated personnel, then the
university could be found liable for having failed to implement effective sexual harass-
ment procedures. See infra notes 343-49 and accompanying text; see also Schneider,
supra note 18, at 571 (explaining how a university must publicize its sexual harass-
ment policies, or else be subject to liability).
336. See Russo et al., supra note 66, at 742 (noting that a campus discussion on the
issue of sexual harassment would focus attention on the problem and inspire efforts to
eliminate it).
337. This list of personnel is offered as an example. Each university should estab-
lish its own particular list of "knowledgeable personnel" based on the authority that
the university delegates to its employees. See supra note 291. The OCR, the federal
agency charged with implementing Title IX, should have the ultimate authority to
approve the list for use by the university.
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ing difficult and emotional experiences.338  Because the university
must attempt to remedy a sexual harassment situation or incur liabil-
ity once a designated person has "actual knowledge," it is essential
that the apprehension of subjecting the university to this liability not
dissuade professors from having a student share a situation of harass-
ment with them. Nor should the threat of liability drive universities to
curb a professor's accessibility to students or to discourage professors
from developing connections with students.3 9 Accordingly, profes-
sors, in addition to other designated personnel, should be required to
ask the student whether she wants to exercise the university's report-
ing and grievance procedures?40 If the student only wishes to share
the incident in confidence and does not want the issue to proceed fur-
ther, then the university should be absolved from liability based on its
knowledge. 4 In such a situation, the university should not be found
to have committed any "culpable behavior." 2
The third instance in which a university should be held liable under
Title IX for professor-student sexual harassment is if the institution
did not have effective and accessible sexual harassment procedures
established at the time of the harassment.343 Because this Note advo-
338. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
339. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 534 ("If sexual harassment is to be eradicated,
a credible legal definition [of sexual harassment] must allow effective prosecution of
complaints without chilling all professionally appropriate faculty-student
relationships.").
340. See Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that
when one of the plaintiff-victims reported the sexual harassment to the Iona College
dean, the dean "provided her with copies of the relevant college policies and offered
to assist her in filing a formal complaint"), vacated sub non:. Kracunas v. Iona Col-
lege, 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
341. Id. at 1023 ("A college official would seem to be morally bound to accept such
a direction on the part of a student that confidentiality be maintained."). While this
does not necessarily protect the interests of future potential victims, a student-victim,
particularly one of majority age, should not be forced to pursue redress measures that
she is not ready or willing to take. See id.
342. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
343. See Brief of the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners, available in 1998 WVL 19697, at *18-19, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-1866), granting cert. to 106 F.3d 1223 (5th
Cir.) (stating that "[e]ducational efforts effectively increased female undergraduate
awareness of the university's sexual harassment policy and grievance procedure and
also raised their awareness of the illegality of sexual harassment"); OCR Guidance,
supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,038 (stating that grievance procedures "provide schools
with an excellent mechanism to be used in their efforts to prevent sexual harassment
before it occurs"); Effective Sexual Harassment Training of College Faculty: Confer-
ence Attendees Highlight Challenges, Offer Suggestions, in Educator's Guide, supra
note 21, Monthly Bulletin 3, January 1997 ("Adequate faculty training is one of the
most crucial issues an educational institution faces-along with establishment of
grievance procedures and proper investigation of complaints-in ensuring its students
are protected from harassment and it is protected from liability."); Elizabeth A. Wil-
liams et al., The Impact of a University Policy on the Sexual Harassment of Female
Students, 63 J. Higher Educ. 50, 60-61 (1992) (finding that effective sexual harassment
policies reduce sexual harassment and increase awareness).
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cates for a standard of liability that emphasizes the prevention of sex-
ual harassment on campus before it occurs, it is necessary that
universities develop, implement, and enforce measures that aim to
achieve this goal.3" As suggested by the National Education Associa-
tion, the measures should include: a clear and unambiguous sexual
harassment policy;345 grievance procedures that encourage students to
report sexually harassing conduct;346 and, a prevention program en-
compassing sexual harassment training and education for professors
and students347 as well as sexual harassment monitoring by the univer-
sity before the school receives a complaint and after the school re-
ceives any suggestions of harassment.348 Although the obligation that
Title IX creates, and for which this Note advocates, does not support a
strict liability standard, the absence of these measures should auto-
matically impute liability upon the university for failing to meet its
A plaintiff must only demonstrate the existence of "severe or pervasive" sexual
harassment in order to impute liability upon a school under this theory.
344. See It's Not Academic, supra note 317, at 4 ("Adoption of strong preventive
measures is often the best way to confront the serious problem of sexual
harassment.").
345. Brief of the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae in support of
Petitioners at *16, Gebser (No. 96-1866); see It's Not Academic, supra note 317, at 3
(stating that an effective sexual harassment policy "clearly states sexual harassment
will not be tolerated and.., explains what types of conduct will be considered sexual
harassment"); cf Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, available in 1998 WL 24199, at *17, Gebser (No. 96-1866) (discussing the negative
repercussions of either not having or not disseminating sexual harassment policies
throughout the school community).
346. Brief of the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae in support of
Petitioners at *16-17, Gebser (No. 96-1866); see Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 73 (1986) (noting that grievance procedures should be "calculated to encourage
victims of harassment to come forward"); OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed. Reg. at
12,044 (listing six elements of "prompt and equitable" grievance procedures: (1) no-
tice of the procedures to all students and school employees; (2) application of the
procedure to complaints of harassment; (3) effective investigation of complaints, in-
cluding the opportunity to offer witnesses and other evidence; (4) establishing time
frames for the complaint process; (5) notice to all parties of the complaint's outcome;
(6) if appropriate, to assure that the institution will take steps to prevent recurrence of
the harassment). The procedures must indicate the "actual knowledge" personnel of
the university. See supra note 335 and accompanying text. In addition, the procedures
should explain the disciplinary options that a university shall take if it finds that a
professor did sexually harass a student.
347. Brief of the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae in support of
Petitioners at *18-20, Gebser (No. 96-1866); see OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed.
Reg. at 12,044 (stating that "training for administrators, teachers, and staff and age-
appropriate classroom information for students can help to ensure that they under-
stand what types of conduct can cause sexual harassment and that they know how to
respond").
348. See Brief of the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae in support
of Petitioners at *19-20, Gebser (No. 96-1866). The National Education Association
("NEA") argues that schools must "monitor[ ] teacher compliance" with the institu-
tion's sexual harassment policy and with the "lessons of its training and education
instruction." Id. at *20. The NEA describes effective monitoring as "following up on
any information suggesting instances of teacher sexual harassment and by taking
prompt and effective action to correct any deviation from those norms." Id.
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legal obligation, and for failing to undertake efforts to prevent sexual
harassment.349
Conversely, however, if the university shows these procedures ex-
isted and were properly utilized during the time of the sexual harass-
ment claim at issue, that should be an affirmative defense to liability
under Title TX.35° The university, in such a scenario, would have met
its affirmative obligation under Title IX to not discriminate on the
basis of sex.351 In addition, if the university had actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment, the utilization of these measures would
demonstrate that the school acted appropriately to remedy the
situation.
B. Applying the Model Standard
The remainder of this section will apply the model standard's three
theories of liability to the facts presented in Kracunas v. Iona Col-
lege. 5 The lona case provides fertile ground for exploring how this
Note's model standard is well suited to the new developments in the
case law. First, Iona may be liable if plaintiffs can demonstrate that
the college had constructive knowledge of Pallett's harassment and
did not act to remedy the situation. 3  Specifically, plaintiffs must
prove that the sexual harassment was egregious or rampant in order to
infer that Iona "should have known" about the harassment. Plaintiffs
could achieve this if they could show that Iona had indeed received
the five previous complaints from other students concerning Professor
Palma.354 A fact-finder should consider knowledge of five prior com-
plaints concerning the same individual as egregious or rampant. 55
349. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
*18, Gebser (No. 96-1866) (explaining that the lack of effective sexual harassment
procedures may: (1) contribute to a perception that the school was granting a teacher
the authority to harass students; or (2) prevent a school from learning of harassment
about which it should have known); Schneider, supra note 18, at 583 (noting that
universities that do not have effective sexual harassment policies in place "leave
themselves open to charges of impermissibly discriminating against women by not
facing the problem of sexual harassment and by failing to comply with their legal
duty").
350. See Brief of the National Education Association as Amicus Curiae in support
of Petitioners at *3, Gebser (No. 96-1866); see also Barbara Vatts, Legal Issues, in
Ivory Power, supra note 26, at 20 ("[T]he institutions should be able to avoid liability
by showing that, as soon as it learned of the harassment, it investigated and punished
the offending individual.").
351. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the university's affirma-
tive obligation under Title IX).
352. 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997); see supra notes 1-14 and the accompanying text for
a discussion of the Kracunas case and the decisions rendered by the district and appel-
late courts.
353. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
354. See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 84.
355. See supra note 324 (noting that one factor that courts may consider in deter-
mining whether conduct is egregious or rampant is the conduct's frequency). There
also may be an argument that this is "actual knowledge" of the harassment.
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Thus, this could permit a charge that Iona should have known about
the harassment and should have conducted an inquiry into the accu-
racy of the complaints. Iona's failure to do so is negligent behavior for
which it should be liable.356
If, however, there were no prior complaints and Pallett was the only
victim of Palma's harassment, Iona's knowledge of that incident
should not be inferred, and a fact-finder should not consider Palma's
conduct egregious or rampant. Factors in forming this conclusion in-
clude: the harassment occurred behind closed doors in Palma's of-
fice; 3 5 7 the harassment occurred once, not on numerous occasions
over a period of time;358 Pallett did not require immediate medical or
counseling assistance; and, finally, the nature of the closed-door meet-
ing-such as its length or noise level-did not cause other students or
university employees to become aware of the harassment occurring
inside.359 Thus, without proof of the five previous complaints, a fact-
finder should not conclude that the sexual harassment against Pallett
was egregious or rampant so that Iona should have known of it.
The second theory of liability under which Iona may be found liable
is if the college had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment and
did not act to remedy the situation.36 ° Under this theory, because the
fact-finder does not have to justify an inference of Iona's constructive
356. See supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text (discussing the OCR's support
for a constructive notice standard based on a school's "obligation to respond").
357. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 83; see also Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1024
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (arguing that a professor who "clandestinely" violates school policies
should not cause the institution to confront liability), vacated sub nom. Kracunas, 119
F.3d at 80.
358. See Roth, supra note 26, at 518 (noting that "[h]arassers generally conduct a
pattern of harassment, thus making it more likely that they will be detected if a school
is reasonably alert"). To infer Iona's constructive knowledge due to the rampant na-
ture of the sexual harassment, scenarios such as the following must have occurred:
Professor Palma had consistently sought private meetings with Pallett that were
known to the university community; Pallett had made previous complaints regarding
Palma's conduct; or, there is proof of the five prior sexual harassment complaints filed
against Palma by other students.
359. See supra note 324 and accompanying text (noting the factors that should be
considered in an "egregious or rampant" analysis); see also Roth, supra note 26, at 518
(noting, as a factor in determining whether a school "should have known" of harass-
ment, that the "degree to which other students know about sexual harassment of
other students should be highly relevant"). To infer Iona's constructive knowledge
due to the egregiousness of the sexual harassment, scenarios such as the following
must have occurred: Pallett was seen emotionally distraught by a university employee
subsequent to her meeting with Palma; or, the meeting was violent, noisy or ex-
tremely long. As is the case with "severe or pervasive" sexual harassment, plaintiffs
may not have to satisfy both the "egregious" and the "rampant" levels of harassment
in order to be able to infer the university's knowledge. See OCR Guidance, supra
note 23, Fed. Reg. at 12,041 (explaining that "conduct that is sufficiently severe, but
not ... pervasive, can result in hostile environment sexual harassment").
360. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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knowledge,36' plaintiffs are only required to demonstrate that "severe
or pervasive" sexual harassment occurred and that a designated indi-
vidual was aware of the harassment. 362 Applied to the Kracunas case,
Iona received actual knowledge of the harassment when Pallett dis-
cussed Professor Palma's conduct with the Dean of Students.3 63 The
actual knowledge of a university official whose responsibilities in-
cluded the handling of complaints filed against university employees
should be imputed to Iona.364 Whether Iona's response to its actual
knowledge of the sexual harassment constituted an appropriate rem-
edy to the situation is a factual question for the jury. 5 One factual
issue to resolve is whether Pallett requested that the dean keep her
complaint confidential. As the Second Circuit noted, there are dis-
puted facts regarding this request.366 If the fact-finder determines that
the plaintiffs requested that the dean maintain confidentiality regard-
ing their complaints, then Iona should not face liability based on its
actual knowledge.367
Lastly, to assess Iona's liability, there must be a factual determina-
tion as to whether Iona had effective and accessible sexual harassment
procedures at the time of Pallett's harassment. Regardless of whether
the harassment is "severe or pervasive," or reaches the level of "egre-
gious or rampant," a lack of appropriate procedures should render
Iona liable.368 The Second Circuit's decision did not, however, con-
361. See Roth, supra note 26, at 518 (insisting that a court must be able to -justify
[the] inference of constructive knowledge"); cf OCR Guidance, supra note 23, Fed.
Reg. at 12,038 (defining hostile environment sexual harassment as conduct that is
"sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive to... create a hostile or abusive educa-
tional environment").
362. See supra note 343 and accompanying text; see also supra note 324 (discussing
factors to consider for a "severe or pervasive" analysis).
363. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 84.
364. The Dean of Students should be included in Iona's list of "knowledgeable per-
sonnel." Id at 90 (discussing the Dean of Students' authority and power within the
university and his relationship to Iona's students).
365. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 89. But see Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1025
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (relying primarily on two factors to rule as a matter of law that Iona's
response was appropriate: (1) that plaintiffs asked the dean to keep the complaints
confidential; and (2) the plaintiffs chose not to participate in lona's grievance proce-
dures), vacated sub nonL Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 80. It is significant to note that lona
did take a number of actions subsequent to receiving Pallett's complaint, including:
providing Pallett with information relating to Iona's grievance procedures and en-
couraging its use; providing Pallett with counseling; discussing the complaint with Pal-
lett and her parents; and suspending Professor Palma from teaching duties. Kracunas,
119 F.3d at 84-85. These responses to the school's actual notice of the harassment are
appropriate and should satisfy Iona's duty to "act to remedy the situation." See supra
note 322.
366. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 90.
367. See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of a re-
quest for confidence by the complaining student); see also Pallett, 914 F. Supp. at 1025
(stating that, without further involvement by plaintiff, Iona wold have been "power-
less" to proceed with termination proceedings against Professor Palma).
368. See supra notes 343-49 and accompanying text.
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sider any of the following: the quality of the university's policy re-
garding sexual harassment, the grievance procedures that Iona had
and their effectiveness, or whether Iona had conducted sexual harass-
ment training or education programs for its faculty and students. 69
Thus, it is necessary for the fact-finder to determine whether these
measures adequately satisfy Iona's affirmative duty to prohibit sexual
harassment on campus. 37 °
Accordingly, a fact-finder should determine, through the use of this
Note's model standard of institutional liability, that Iona had con-
structive knowledge of the rampant nature of Professor Palma's
harassing conduct, contingent on proof of the five previous com-
plaints. In addition, the model standard would find that Iona had ac-
tual knowledge-obtained by the dean-of Pallett's sexual
harassment, contingent on a finding that Pallett did not request the
dean to maintain confidentiality. To assess liability under Iona's con-
structive or actual knowledge, the fact-finder must determine whether
Iona acted appropriately to remedy the situation.371 Lastly, the model
standard would render Iona liable if the fact-finder determines that
the college did not have effective and accessible sexual harassment
procedures at the time of Pallet's harassment.
CONCLUSION
The serious responsibility that universities have to their students to
protect them from sexual harassment is not absolute. The use of a
strict liability standard does not effectively achieve the ultimate goal
of preventing sexual harassment before it occurs. Strict liability cre-
ates disincentives for effective grievance and investigative procedures.
Universities may be tempted to adopt a head-in-the-sand approach
rather than monitor or investigate a situation which may be in viola-
tion of Title IX and which would subsequently cause the institution to
face liability.
The no knowledge liability standard may be prudent to apply
against elementary and secondary schools because of the age of the
students, the special responsibility that the State designates to these
educational institutions, the inherent societal and legal disdain for
369. See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 89 (discussing the application of agency principles
and focusing solely on the occurrence of the harassment and Palma's relation to the
college). In fact, Iona did have a sexual harassment policy that complied with statu-
tory guidelines. Pallett, 914 F. Supp. at 1021-22. But see Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 89
(stating that "[a]lthough Iona maintained a sexual harassment policy .... the mere
existence of reasonable complaint procedures does not insulate Iona from liability for
sexual harassment claims"); see also supra note 365 (outlining other steps that Iona
took upon receiving knowledge of Pallett's harassment complaint).
370. See supra note 8 (providing Title IX's language).
371. See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 91 (remanding the case to resolve several factual
issues including whether Iona took prompt and appropriate action upon its notice of
Palma's sexually harassing conduct).
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those who commit such acts, and because the school has, through its
close association with its teachers, adopted the role of parent to the
child. These factors, however, are not present in the university
setting.
Title IX expressly asserts that no educational institution shall sub-
ject a student to sexual discrimination. This goal, however, is not
achieved through the plain existence of a statute, or through imputing
liability for every instance that a university falls short of this goal.
Across the country, universities are failing to comply with Title IX due
to regular occurrences of professor-student sexual harassment. The
Supreme Court has stated that in order to give Title IX "the scope
that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its lan-
guage." '3 72 Institutional liability is one important element of that
sweep. This Note offers a standard of institutional liability which en-
sures the university's effective application of the measures that a uni-
versity must adopt to eradicate sexual harassment on campus.
372. North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
Notes & Observations
